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Post- Kelo Reform
Since Kelo v. City of New London, the preferred litigation 
strategy for challenging a condemnation that benefi ts a 
private party is to allege that the taking is “pretextual.” 
This Article contends that, although pretextual takings are 
socially undesirable, the current judicial test for identifying 
such takings is problematic. Yet an alternative, intent- based 
test might be impracticable, as well as underinclusive: con-
demnors often have mixed motives, particularly when con-
fronted with a fi rm’s credible threat to relocate. Instead, the 
Article develops a framework that emphasizes informational 
differences between local governments and private develop-
ers. When the government lacks information regarding the 
optimal site for an assembly, the government may need to 
rely on a private party to identify, as well as develop, a par-
ticular site. However, when the government itself possesses 
information regarding the site, pre- condemnation private 
involvement, as well as post- condemnation involvement by 
a preferred developer, is generally unnecessary. Such involve-
ment increases the likelihood of a pretextual transfer without 
any corresponding public benefi t. The Article concludes that 
a burden- shifting framework, analogous to Title VII’s test for 
identifying pretext, can be adopted in the takings context. 
The new framework is then applied to several situations in 
which allegations of pretext are likely to arise.
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1 545 US 469 (2005) (holding that a city’s use of eminent domain to transfer property 
from one private party to another private party does not violate the Public Use Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment—“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation”—if the condemnation may have an incidental public benefi t of 
promoting economic development).
2 Compare id at 478 (Stevens) (asserting that a city would not be allowed “to take 
property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to 
bestow a private benefi t” (emphasis added)) with id at 502 (O’Connor dissenting) (“If 
it is true that incidental public benefi ts from new private use are enough to ensure the 
‘public purpose’ in a taking, why should it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is 
concerned, what inspired the taking in the fi rst place?”).
3 See Goldstein v Pataki, 516 F3d 50, 61 (2d Cir 2008) (“Prior to Kelo, no Supreme 
Court decision had endorsed the notion of a ‘pretext’ claim . . . .”) The term “pretext” 
did appear in West River Bridge Co v Dix, 47 US 507 (1848), but the reference is merely 
a quotation from Kent’s Commentaries, id at 519 (quoting 2 Kent’s Comm 340).
4 Kelo, 545 US at 478 & n 6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Justice 
Stevens also cited one case, 99 Cents Only Stores v Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 
237 F Supp 2d 1123 (CD Cal 2001), for the proposition that “a one- to-one transfer of 
property, executed outside the confi nes of an integrated development plan . . . would 
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot . . . .” Kelo, 545 US at 487 
& n 17. However, because the condemnation in 99 Cents Only did occur pursuant 
to a development plan the discussion of pretext proved to be ambiguous as well as 
brief. 99 Cents Only, 237 F Supp 2d at 1125; see Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping 
Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 S Ct Econ Rev 183, 236 (2007) 
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London,1 the underlying assumption of Kelo’s critics, as well as its 
defenders, has been that, when compared with Justice O’Connor’s dis-
senting opinion, the opinion of the Court is less protective of private 
property rights. In at least one respect, however, the Court’s opinion 
arguably is more protective of property rights than O’Connor’s dis-
sent. Whereas O’Connor appeared to suggest that the government’s 
motivation for a taking is irrelevant, the Court acknowledged the 
possibility that a condemnation might violate the Public Use Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment if its purpose was pretextual.2
Although Kelo is the fi rst eminent domain case in which the Court 
considered this issue of pretext,3 the Court failed to provide much 
guidance. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens briefl y mentioned 
two reasons for concluding that the takings at issue were not pretex-
tual: the condemnations “would be executed pursuant to a carefully 
considered development plan” and “the identities of th[e] private 
parties were not known when the plan was adopted.”4 In a concur-
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(noting that “even . . . the case that Stevens’ opinion cites as a paradigmatic example 
of impermissible favoritism” involved a plan).
5 Kelo, 545 US at 493 (Kennedy concurring).
6 Overall, Kennedy emphasized that (i) ”the projected economic benefi ts of the 
project cannot be characterized as de minimis”; (ii) ”the taking occurred in the con-
text of a comprehensive development plan”; (iii) “[t]he city complied with elaborate 
procedural requirements”; and (iv) “[t]he identities of most of the private benefi ciaries 
were unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.” Id.
7 See Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160, 169 (DC 2007) (sug-
gesting that “the Supreme Court’s decision may raise many more questions than it 
answers”); Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Prop-
erty Rights, 2005 Sup Ct Rev 103, 120 (asserting that Kennedy’s factors “raise more 
questions than they answer about when departure from the rational basis framework 
might be warranted”).
8 See Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State 
Responses to Kelo, 17 S Ct Econ Rev 237 (2009) (“In the two years after the June 23, 
2005 decision, legislation to restrict eminent domain powers was introduced in forty-
 six states, with multiple bills in many states, and forty- two states enacted legislation 
or constitutional amendments restricting the use of eminent domain.”).
9 See Ga Code Ann, § 22-1-3 (“It is the province of the General Assembly to deter-
mine when the right of eminent domain may be exercised. If, however, under pretext 
of such necessity the General Assembly should pass a law authorizing the taking of 
property for private use rather than for public use, the courts should declare the law 
inoperative.”).
10 See Texas SB 7 (Sept. 1, 2005) (“A governmental or private entity may not take 
private property through the use of eminent domain if the taking . . . is for a public use 
that is merely a pretext to confer a private benefi t on a particular private party . . . .”); 
Idaho HB 555 (Mar. 21, 2006) (“Eminent domain shall not be used to acquire private 
property . . . [f]or any alleged public use which is merely a pretext for the transfer of the 
condemned property or any interest in that property to a private party . . . .”).
ring opinion, Justice Kennedy indicated that his agreement with the 
Court did not “foreclose the possibility that a more stringent stan-
dard of review . . . might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn 
category of takings.”5 Kennedy highlighted two additional factors, 
the expected public benefi ts of the project and the city’s compliance 
with procedural requirements, in concluding that a “more demand-
ing” standard was inappropriate for a case like Kelo.6 However, it is 
unclear whether each of these four factors (or perhaps some combina-
tion of them) is determinative or even whether these factors should 
be determinative.7
Notwithstanding the general backlash against eminent domain 
since Kelo,8 the specifi c issue of pretext has received relatively little 
legislative attention. Only one state, Georgia, mentioned “pretext” 
in its statutory law before Kelo.9 Only two others, Texas and Idaho, 
enacted similar provisions after Kelo.10 Yet even the statutes in these 
three states merely indicate that pretextual takings are prohibited; 
they do not provide any criterion by which a taking might be identi-
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11 See Kelo, 545 US at 478 (holding that “the City’s development plan was not 
adopted ‘to benefi t a particular class of identifi able individuals’ ” (quoting Hawaii 
Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 245 (1984)).
12 A few states did enact procedural reforms aimed at reducing the likelihood of 
abuse. See, for example, Minn SF 2750 (May 19, 2006) (requiring a public hearing and 
a resolution describing, inter alia, the “public costs and benefi ts”). These reforms may 
increase, what Thomas Merrill has called, the “due process costs” of eminent domain. 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L Rev 61, 87 (1986). Yet 
procedural requirements only address the issue of pretext indirectly. See Part III(A)(2).
13 See, for example, Goldstein, 516 F3d 50; Franco, 930 A2d 160; Middletown Town-
ship v Lands of Stone, 939 A2d 331 (Pa 2007); 49 WB, LLC v Village of Haverstraw, 44 
AD3d 226 (NY App Div 2007); Didden v Village of Port Chester, 2006 US App LEXIS 
8653, 2006 WL 898093 (2d Cir 2006).
14 Cf. Kelo, 545 US at 502 (O’Connor dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s opinion for 
not “detailing how courts are to conduct th[e] complicated inquiry” into pretextual 
motivation and Kennedy’s concurrence for not “specifying what courts should look 
for in a case with different facts, how they will know if they have found it, and what 
to do if they do not”).
15 See Part II(A).
fi ed as pretextual. In light of the Court’s holding that the particular 
condemnations at issue were not pretextual,11 the Court’s reluctance 
to articulate a clear test for determining whether a taking is pretex-
tual, and the dissent’s skepticism about whether pretext is even rele-
vant, a more robust legislative response may have been warranted.12
The legislatures’ lack of attention, coupled with the Court’s lack 
of clarity, has created signifi cant uncertainty for both litigants and 
lower courts. In several post- Kelo cases, litigants have attempted to 
invoke the Court’s reference to “pretext” in challenging condemna-
tions that allegedly benefi t private parties.13 However, in deciding 
these cases, lower courts have relied on a number of different ana-
lytical frameworks and reached a number of different substantive 
conclusions. There are disagreements about whether a condemnor’s 
motivation matters; whether, if motivation does matter, there are 
ways for courts to identify it; what the Supreme Court’s “test” for 
pretext actually requires; and whether, and to what extent, the vari-
ous factors in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence should be utilized as 
persuasive authority.14 Yet, despite this uncertainty, it is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court will provide further clarifi cation in the near 
future.
In this Article, I propose a new framework for evaluating whether 
a taking is pretextual. In Part II, I examine whether pretextual takings 
are, in fact, problematic. I contend that unlimited private involve-
ment may result in a number of problems including corruption, 
secondary rent seeking, and threats to relocate, each of which may 
increase the likelihood of undesirable transfers.15 I also consider three 
of the most signifi cant arguments against judicial consideration of 
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16 See Part II(B).
17 See Part III(A).
18 See Part III(B).
19 See Part IV(A).
20 See Part IV(B).
21 See Part V(A).
22 See Part V(B).
pretext: disutility, futility, and judicial administrability.16 I conclude 
that implementing a framework for evaluating pretext is likely to be 
worthwhile only if these objections can be overcome.
In Part III, I identify several problems with the current test, as 
articulated in the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo and the 
subsequent decisions of lower federal and state courts.17 I then sug-
gest why one plausible alternative, a test based on the condemnor’s 
motivation, is impracticable, as well as underinclusive.18 The short-
comings of these tests suggest the need for a different approach.
In Part IV, I outline a new approach based on the comparative com-
petencies of public and private actors. I fi rst point out that assembly 
projects actually involve two distinct stages, identifi cation of the 
assembly site and development of the assembly site.19 I then con-
tend that, because private parties play a different role at each stage, 
a local government may need to rely on private parties for certain 
types of takings but not others.20 Specifi cally, when the government 
itself has information regarding the optimal site, pre- condemnation 
private involvement, as well as post- condemnation involvement 
by a preferred developer, is generally unnecessary. Under these 
circumstances, the expected costs of private involvement almost 
certainly outweigh its potential benefi ts. By contrast, when the 
government does not have information regarding the optimal site, 
pre- condemnation private involvement may be necessary to identify 
the site. In these situations, allocating development rights through 
auctions or other competitive mechanisms aimed at reducing the 
likelihood of pretext might eliminate the incentive for certain devel-
opers to reveal socially useful information.
In Part V, I suggest that either legislatures or courts might imple-
ment this theory on either the state or federal level by adopting a 
burden- shifting test similar to the framework for identifying pretext 
in adverse employment actions under Title VII.21 I illustrate how 
this framework might apply in the takings context by considering 
condemnations in blighted areas as well as situations involving rede-
velopment districts, new assemblies, positive externalities, changed 
circumstances, one- to-one transfers, and “same- use” takings.22
Finally, in Part VI, I conclude with several predictions regarding 
the likely role of pretextual analysis in eminent domain law. I main-
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23 Elsewhere, I have argued that the necessity of utilizing eminent domain on behalf 
of private parties may be overstated: private parties, unlike the government, often 
can overcome strategic holdouts without relying on eminent domain. See generally 
Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Ratio-
nale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Infl uence, 92 Cornell L Rev 1, 18-33 
(2006); see also Robert C. Ellickson and Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and 
Materials 845-54 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed 2005) (discussing ability of private fi rms to 
assemble land without resorting to eminent domain). In the discussion that follows, 
I assume that private involvement does have certain advantages and that, at least in 
certain circumstances, the advantages of private involvement outweigh any potential 
disadvantages. This assumption is plausible for three reasons. First, eminent domain 
traditionally has been utilized for certain types of private takings, including assem-
bling land for railroads, in which the holdout problem is particularly acute. See Kelly, 
92 Cornell L Rev at 59-61 (cited in this note); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political 
Court, 119 Harv L Rev 31, 93-94 (2004) (discussing use of eminent domain for “private 
fi rms, such as railroads and pipeline companies”). Second, even in situations in which 
the holdout problem is arguably less problematic, private parties may be more effec-
tive than the government at developing a previously assembled site. See Kelo v City 
of New London, 545 US 469, 486 (2005) (quoting Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 33-34 
(1954)). Third, under the current state of the law, almost all states, including most of 
the states that have enacted post- Kelo reforms, continue to permit private involve-
ment in a number of circumstances. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: 
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn L Rev 2100, 2103-04 (2009) (review-
ing post- Kelo legislation and concluding that “the majority of the newly enacted post-
Kelo laws are likely to be ineffective” in preventing private takings).
24 See Gideon Kanner, We Don’t Have to Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning—Sorry 
About That, Justice Stevens, 39 Urb Law 529, 537-38 (2007) (pointing out that “munic-
ipal functionaries are often unduly infl uenced or even controlled by private interests 
that, apart from instances of outright corruption, gain infl uence in city hall by means 
of political connections and campaign contributions, which are often the mother’s 
milk of municipal politics”); Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and 
Public- Private Economic Redevelopment, 34 Ecology L Q 1, 58 (2007) (asserting that 
tain that a failure to develop a coherent jurisprudence of pretext could 
result in excessive judicial deference or excessive judicial discretion, 
either of which might exacerbate the public’s reaction against Kelo.
I I .  D E S I R A B I L I T Y  O F  TA R G E T I N G 
P R E T E X T
A. Risks of Private Involvement
Allowing unlimited private involvement in the eminent domain pro-
cess raises a number of potential concerns.23 First, private involve-
ment may increase the risk of corruption and inordinate infl uence. 
Certain private parties may use side payments, bribes, kickbacks, 
lobbyists, and campaign contributions to encourage local offi cials to 
approve takings that are not in the public interest.24 While taxpayers 
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“the process is in fact susceptible to corruption, a concern, however, that arises not so 
much from this public- private partnership as it does from the intrinsic role fi nancial 
support of political candidates plays in the current electoral process”); Clayton P. Gil-
lette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 Hofstra L Rev 13, 16 (2005) (noting that 
a “big- box store owner, which expects to benefi t from siting within the locality, will 
care a lot, enough to attempt to invest heavily in lobbying local offi cials to approve the 
condemnation”); cf. Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at 308-09 (cited in note 23) 
(discussing corruption in land use planning)
25 See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 34-35 (cited in note 23).
26 See id at 37.
27 See Richard Brooks, Kelo and the “Whaling City”: A Search for the Urban Public 
Interest, 35 Real Est L J 223, 237 (2006) (noting that the “close relationship between 
public and private . . . can also serve to delegitimize public urban development efforts 
if it is perceived to be merely an instrument of private interests”); cf. Buckley v Valeo, 
424 US 1, 27 (1976) (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo 
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public 
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual fi nan-
cial contributions.”).
28 See, for example, United States v Miller, 317 US 369, 375 (1943); see also David A. 
Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy, Ambiguous Economics, 
and The Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 Vt L Rev 129, 139 (2007) (noting that, 
“in the case of covert assembly, landowners are also denied any of the value that may 
result from successful assembly”).
29 Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 86 (cited in note 12); see also Gregory S. Alexander, 
Eminent Domain and Secondary Rent- Seeking, 1 NYU J L & Liberty 958, 959 (2005) 
(defi ning secondary rent seeking as “efforts by interest groups to acquire (or defeat) a 
legislative grant of eminent domain” (citing Merrill)).
who pay just compensation bear a relatively diffuse cost, private par-
ties that benefi t from the use of eminent domain obtain a relatively 
concentrated benefi t.25 This concentrated benefi t creates an incen-
tive for parties to pursue the use of eminent domain even when a tak-
ing may not be consistent with the public interest.26 A condemnation 
process that avoids the appearance of corruption is also likely to be 
superior, all other things being equal, to a process that does not.27
Second, unlimited private involvement may lead to the problem 
of secondary rent seeking. If the value of several parcels as assembled 
is greater than the value of the parcels if fragmented, assembling 
the parcels through eminent domain creates a surplus. Assuming 
the condemnees receive fair market value (or even their subjective 
value) as just compensation, this surplus inures to the benefi t of the 
condemnor.28 Yet, as Thomas Merrill has pointed out, “allocating the 
condemnation’s entire surplus to the condemnor . . . may produce 
a kind of secondary rent seeking of its own, as competing interest 
groups attempt to acquire or defeat a legislative grant of the power 
of eminent domain.”29 Private efforts to capture eminent domain 
or oppose its use constitute a social waste, and, in certain circum-
stances, the costs of such efforts may exceed the benefi ts of the as-
This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:52:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
180 Pretextual Takings
30 See Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Tak-
ings Clause, 40 Idaho L Rev 11, 50 (2003) (pointing out that “if the surplus produced 
by a government action can be distributed disproportionately, then people will waste 
resources trying to capture as much of this surplus as possible”); see also Nathan Burd-
sal, Note, Just Compensation and the Seller’s Paradox, 20 BYU J Pub L 79, 90 (2005) 
(noting that “landowners engage in rent- seeking by trying to maximize the gain that 
they receive from society even when the gain creates social waste”).
31 See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 87 (cited in note 12) (noting that “eminent 
domain is most likely to foster secondary rent- seeking behavior . . . where one or a 
small number of persons will capture a taking’s surplus”); see also Nicole Stelle Gar-
nett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 Mich L Rev 101, 139 
(2006) (pointing out “would-be benefi ciaries of an economic development taking have 
a substantial incentive to engage in rent- seeking”).
32 304 NW2d 455 (Mich 1981) (per curiam), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hath-
cock, 684 NW2d 765 (Mich 2004).
33 See id 460 (Fitzgerald dissenting) (“In the spring of 1980, General Motors Corpo-
ration informed the City of Detroit that it would close its Cadillac and Fisher Body 
plants located within the city in 1983. General Motors offered to build an assembly 
complex in the city, if a suitable site could be found.”); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, 
Book Review, Property and Economic Liberty as Civil Rights: The Magisterial History 
of James W. Ely, Jr., 52 Vand L Rev 737, 758 (1999) (noting that the Poletown condem-
nations occurred “in order to avert General Motors’ threatened partial departure from 
Detroit”).
34 Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 NW2d at 461 (Fitzgerald dissenting).
35 Id at 460; see also Michael Heller and Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 
Harv L Rev 1465, 1510 (2008) (citing Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sus-
taining Hand: Community Leadership and Corporate Power 74-76 (U Press of Kansas, 
1986)).
sembly.30 Rent seeking is thus a distinct possibility whenever a pri-
vate party expects to obtain all or a signifi cant portion of a taking’s 
surplus.31
Third, the possibility of private involvement in the condemnation 
process may lead private parties to threaten to relocate unless the 
local government condemns land on their behalf. Companies that 
provide towns or cities with substantial tax revenue and that are 
capable of moving to other locations know that such threats are cred-
ible. But these types of threats are problematic: they may pressure 
local offi cials to use eminent domain even though, in the absence 
of the threat, offi cials would not deem the taking to be in the public 
interest. Two examples from the cases illustrate this problem.
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,32 General 
Motors Corporation (GM) threatened to relocate one of its factories 
if the City of Detroit did not provide a suitable site for a new fac-
tory.33 The City, concerned that GM might decide to build its factory 
elsewhere, agreed to condemn several hundred acres under the state’s 
“quick take” statute.34 Although it analyzed nine different sites as 
possible options, the City ultimately selected Poletown, a residential 
neighborhood that matched all of GM’s specifi cations.35 The rest 
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36 See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 194-95 (cited in note 4).
37 237 F Supp 2d 1123 (CD Cal 2001).




42 Id; see also id at 1129 (“No judicial deference is required . . . where the ostensible 
public use is demonstrably pretextual.” (citing Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F3d 1311, 
1321 (9th Cir 1996) (en banc)).
of the story is familiar: the Michigan Supreme Court approved the 
City’s use of eminent domain, and thousands of people lost their 
homes and businesses, while the GM factory ultimately produced 
fewer jobs and less tax revenue than the City had projected.36
More recently, in 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelop-
ment Agency,37 Costco “threatened to relocate” one of its supermar-
kets unless the City of Lancaster provided it with additional retail 
space.38 Although the owner of the shopping center in which Costco 
leased its store had advised the City of Lancaster that Costco could 
expand behind 99 Cents Only, Costco “demanded” that it be allowed 
to expand directly into the adjacent site then occupied by 99 Cents.39 
Lancaster, “fearful of Costco’s relocation to another city,” began 
negotiating with the shopping center’s owner to purchase the lease 
for Costco’s preferred parcel.40 When negotiations failed, the City 
authorized the condemnation of the lease.41 Unlike in Poletown, the 
court held that the taking at issue was unconstitutional because “the 
very reason that Lancaster decided to condemn 99 Cents’ leasehold 
interest was to appease Costco.”42
Overall, private involvement in the takings process entails a num-
ber of problems: the possibility of actual or perceived corruption, 
the existence of secondary rent seeking, and the issuance of threats 
to relocate. These problems suggest that private involvement may 
result in certain takings that advance a particular private interest but 
that are not necessarily in the public interest. If so, a rule allowing 
unlimited private involvement may be inferior to a rule allowing 
private involvement for certain types of takings but not others. In 
the analysis thus far, however, I have assumed that the process of 
identifying pretextual takings would be costless. In the next section, 
I relax this assumption.
B. Problems with Pretextual Analysis
The costs of permitting unlimited private involvement also can be 
viewed as the benefi ts of scrutinizing a taking for pretextual motiva-
tion. Yet a screening mechanism for pretext is only able to realize 
these benefi ts in an ideal world where a condemnor’s motivation is 
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43 See generally John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Con-
stitutional Law, 79 Yale L J 1205, 1212-17 (1970) (discussing these three problems).
44 For present purposes, I use the terms “purpose,” “motive,” “intent,” and “moti-
vation” interchangeably, although I primarily use the term “motivation.” See id at 
1207 n 1 (noting that, while “purpose” and “motive” are terms more commonly used, 
motivation may have less connotative baggage); see also Lynda J. Oswald, Public 
Uses and Non- Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent 
Domain Law, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 45, 56, 58-61 (2008) (discussing the judicial use 
of the terms “motive,” “purpose,” and “motivation” in the condemnation context). 
But cf. Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160, 173 (DC 2007) (“The 
terms ‘purpose,’ ‘motive,’ and ‘intent’ sometimes are used (imprecisely) as if they were 
interchangeable.”).
45 Kelo, 545 US at 477.
immediately apparent. In reality, determining whether a taking is for 
a public purpose or whether the asserted purpose is a “mere pretext” 
for a private objective is extremely diffi cult. Here, I focus on three 
potential problems with considering motivation: disutility, futility, 
and administrability.43
Permitting courts to analyze pretext means that a court may strike 
down a governmental action because of its underlying motivation.44 
As one might expect, an action that is invalidated on the basis of 
impermissible motivation is often detrimental to social welfare. 
However, an action may be invalidated on the basis of motivation 
even though the action itself is socially benefi cial. The effect of 
invalidating a benefi cial action solely on the basis of the underlying 
motivation is a loss of utility or “disutility.”
It is easy see how the problem of disutility applies in the takings 
context. Evaluating whether a certain use of eminent domain is 
pretextual means that a taking might be invalidated even though 
a forced transfer would have increased social welfare. The Supreme 
Court seemingly has embraced this position in asserting that “it has 
long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of 
A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, 
even though A is paid just compensation.”45 Under this doctrine, a 
taking whose purpose is to transfer a certain property to B would be 
unconstitutional even if a local government could demonstrate with 
metaphysical certainty that B valued the property more than A.
Allowing courts to analyze motivation also may lead to the prob-
lem of “futility.” Futility refers to a court’s inability to prevent gov-
ernmental actions that are based on impermissible motivations be-
cause of the government’s ability to circumvent judicial scrutiny. 
For example, government offi cials can hide their actual motivations, 
including pretextual ones. Moreover, even if a court detects an im-
permissible motivation and invalidates a governmental action on 
that basis, offi cials may decide to take the same action without dis-
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46 Cf. Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 61 (cited in note 44) (concluding that “even 
a condemnor, with clearly improper motives can, with a little effort and forethought, 
articulate a facially valid purpose for the taking and one which is relatively easy and 
relatively inexpensive to effectuate”).
47 See id at 58 (“Judicial reluctance to inquire into the motives underlying legisla-
tive actions (of any type, not just condemnations) is driven by the diffi culty of assess-
ing such motives.”).
48 See United States v O’Brien, 391 US 367, 384 (1968) (Warren, CJ) (“What moti-
vates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what moti-
vates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are suffi ciently high for us to eschew 
guesswork.”).
49 Cf. Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 239 (cited in note 4) (pointing out that local gov-
ernment offi cials who assert that public benefi ts are their true motivation “will not 
always be disingenuous” because “local government offi cials and the private interest 
groups they promote are likely to genuinely believe that policies that serve their po-
litical and economic self- interest also advance the public good”).
closing their actual motivation, thereby circumventing the judicial 
test.
Again, it is easy to see how this problem of futility might arise 
in the takings context. Suppose that a development corporation ap-
proves a condemnation that provides a signifi cant benefi t to a par-
ticular developer. Local offi cials might attempt to hide their actual 
motivation—benefi ting the developer—by asserting a pretextual jus-
tifi cation such as increasing the city’s tax revenue.46 But even if the 
offi cials reveal their true motivation, the condemnees seek injunc-
tive relief, and the court holds that the asserted purpose is pretex-
tual, the development corporation could simply approve the same 
condemnation without revealing the taking’s actual purpose. If the 
condemnations are challenged again and if the court now upholds the 
takings, the court’s original holding—that the condemnations were 
pretextual—turns out to be futile.
Perhaps even more troublesome is the problem of judicial admin-
istrability. Motivation, especially the motivation of government 
offi cials, is extremely diffi cult to establish.47 A member of a state 
legislature does not necessarily reveal what is motivating a particular 
decision. Moreover, even when a legislator makes a statement that is 
indicative of her underlying motivation, that motivation may not be 
the same as the motivations of her fellow legislators.48
This administrability problem arises in the takings context as well. 
It is diffi cult to know the precise reason that a particular member 
of a development corporation votes to authorize the use of eminent 
domain. The member may genuinely believe that the development of 
a particular site will benefi t the public.49 Alternatively, the member 
may favor a private interest that will profi t from the project. Yet, 
even in the unlikely event that a development corporation member 
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50 Cf. Goldstein v Pataki, 516 F3d 50, 63 (2d Cir 2008) (“Beyond being conclusory, 
the claim that the ‘decision to take Plaintiffs’ properties serves only one purpose’ 
defi es both logic and experience. ‘Legislative decisions to invoke the power to con-
demn are by their nature political accommodations of competing concerns.’ ” (quoting 
Brody v Village. of Port Chester, 434 F3d 121, 136 (2d Cir 2005))).
51 See Part II(A).
52 See Kelo, 545 US at 483 (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence 
has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legis-
latures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings 
power.”); id at 503 (O’Connor dissenting) (“The Court rightfully admits . . . that the 
judiciary cannot get bogged down in predictive judgments about whether the public 
will actually be better off after a property transfer.”); see also Goldstein, 516 F3d at 
64-65 (“At the end of the day, we are left with the distinct impression that the law-
suit is animated by concerns about the wisdom of the Atlantic Yards Project and its 
effect on the community. . . . [S]uch matters of policy are the province of the elected 
branches, not this Court.”).
53 For a contrary approach in which the proper scope of private involvement is 
determined through negotiations between public agencies and private developers, see 
Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 40-41 (cited in note 24) (“Public- private negotiations strive 
to determine the most effi cient actors for each development function at each stage in 
the life of a project.”).
declares her motivation, it is nearly impossible to know whether that 
member’s motivation is representative of the other members’ moti-
vations.50
Overall, while targeting pretext has a number of distinct bene-
fi ts,51 it also involves several costs including the potential problems 
of disutility, futility, and administrability. A framework for analyzing 
pretext is only practicable (and, indeed, desirable) if these problems 
can be eliminated or, at least, mitigated. But if the issue ultimately 
is an empirical question that entails weighing the expected bene-
fi ts and costs of private involvement, courts will continue to defer 
to condemnors even in those cases involving credible allegations of 
pretext.52 The objective, then, is to design a test that captures the 
benefi ts of targeting pretext while avoiding the potential costs.53
I I I .  D I F F I C U LT I E S  O F  D E S I G N I N G 
A  T E S T
A. The Current Test Based on Kelo
The current test for identifying whether a taking is “pretextual” is 
less than clear. Some courts have focused on the magnitude of the 
condemnation’s projected public benefi ts. Other courts have inves-
tigated whether the taking is part of a comprehensive development 
plan or whether the condemnor satisfi es certain procedural require-
ments. Still others have examined whether the potential private 
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54 Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy concurring) (empha-
sis added); see also id. (“As the trial court in this case was correct to observe, ‘Where 
the purpose [of a taking] is economic development and that development is to be car-
ried out by private parties or private parties will be benefi ted, the court must decide if 
the stated public purpose—economic advantage to a city sorely in need of it—is only 
incidental to the benefi ts that will be confi ned on private parties of a development 
plan.’” (quoting App to Pet for Cert 263) (emphasis added)).
55 Id at 493.
56 This ambiguity is amplifi ed because, by using the phrase “incidental or pretex-
tual benefi ts,” id at 491 (emphasis added), Kennedy appears to be making a distinction 
between incidental benefi ts and pretextual benefi ts. Such a distinction might imply 
that a taking could result in incidental benefi ts that are not pretextual or, alterna-
tively, pretextual benefi ts that are not incidental.
57 See, for example, Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160, 
173-74 (DC 2007); see also Goldstein v Pataki, 516 F3d 50, 58 (2d Cir 2008) (“[T]he 
instant complaint calls the ‘alleged “public benefi ts” . . . either wildly exaggerated 
or simply false. At best, [they] are incidental; at worst, they are nonexistent.’ Read 
carefully, however, the specifi c allegations in the complaint foreclose any blanket 
suggestion that the Project can be expected to result in no benefi ts to the public.” 
(second alteration in original)).
benefi ciaries are identifi able at the time of the development plan’s 
adoption. Because these three factors—the magnitude of public bene-
fi ts, the extensiveness of government planning and process, and the 
identifi cation of private benefi ciaries—are the primary factors dis-
cussed in the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo, as well as in 
the subsequent case law, I discuss each of them in turn.
1. Magnitude of Public Benefi ts
While the Court itself did not mention whether the magnitude of 
public benefi ts is relevant for identifying pretext, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence emphasized that “[a] court applying rational- basis re-
view under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, 
by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, 
with only incidental or pretextual public benefi ts.”54 Kennedy also 
noted that one of the reasons that the condemnations at issue in Kelo 
were not subject to a more demanding level of scrutiny was that “the 
projected economic benefi ts of the project cannot be characterized as 
de minimis.”55 Unfortunately, Kennedy did not provide any criterion 
by which to determine whether a taking’s benefi ts are “incidental” 
or “de minimis.” As an initial matter, therefore, it is unclear what 
the threshold is for declaring that a condemnation’s public benefi ts 
are so small that the condemnation itself is pretextual.56
Nevertheless, several post- Kelo decisions have focused on the mag-
nitude of public benefi ts as an important, and perhaps decisive, fac-
tor.57 In Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corporation, the 
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58 930 A2d at 162. Four private corporations had prepared a plan to redevelop the 
site into a “fi rst- class, quality mixed- use retail center,” id at 163, and a committee of 
the D.C. Council approved fi ndings that the existing shopping center was a “blighting 
factor,” id. Franco raised a number of defenses and counterclaims including a defense 
that “the declared reason for the taking was pretextual and that the true purpose was 
to confer a private benefi t on a particular private party.” Id at 164.
59 Id at 171.
60 Id at 172.
61 Id at 176.
62 Id at 173-74 (“We conclude that a reviewing court must focus primarily on bene-
fi ts the public hopes to realize from the proposed taking. If the property is being trans-
ferred to another private party, and the benefi ts to the public are only ‘incidental’ or 
‘pretextual,’ a ‘pretext defense may well succeed.’ On the other hand, if the record 
discloses (in the words of the trial court) that the taking will serve ‘an overriding public 
purpose’ and that the proposed development ‘will provide substantial benefi ts to the 
public,’ the courts must defer to the judgment of the legislature.”).
63 Id at 174.
District of Columbia’s development corporation initiated condemna-
tion proceedings against Samuel Franco, the owner of a “Discount 
Mart” store.58 In analyzing Franco’s defenses, the court explained that 
“Kelo makes clear that there is room for a landowner to claim that 
the legislature’s declaration of a public purpose is a pretext designed 
to mask a taking for private purposes.”59 Ultimately, the D.C. Court 
of Appeals held that “Franco adequately pled such a defense”60 and 
thus remanded the case to the trial court.61 In remanding the case, 
the court endorsed Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the magnitude of 
public benefi ts and also proposed a distinction between “substantial” 
and “incidental” benefi ts.62 But, like Kennedy, the court did not offer 
any criterion for determining whether benefi ts are “substantial” or 
“incidental” or for evaluating the “[h]arder cases” that lie “between 
these extremes.”63
In theory, a test that relied on the magnitude of public benefi ts 
could be useful. If the public benefi ts of a taking were relatively large, 
then a court might conclude that such benefi ts outweigh the risk of 
impermissible favoritism. Suppose, for example, that an independent 
analyst estimated that the public benefi ts of a condemnation would 
include 500 new jobs, $4 million in additional tax revenue, and 200 
units of affordable housing. The court might conclude that, notwith-
standing the possibility that the actual purpose of the taking may be 
to benefi t a private developer, the magnitude of the public benefi ts 
justifi es private involvement. Alternatively, if the public benefi ts of 
a taking were relatively small, then a court might conclude that the 
risk of favoritism outweighs any potential public benefi ts. Suppose, 
for example, that an analyst estimated that the public benefi ts of a 
condemnation would include 5 new jobs, $40,000 in tax revenue, 
and 2 units of affordable housing. The court might conclude that, 
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64 545 US at 491 (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added).
65 930 A2d at 173-74 (emphasis added).
66 See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 202 (cited in note 4) (pointing out that “the calcu-
lation of the costs and benefi ts of most development projects is extremely complex”); 
Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 139 (cited in note 31) (“Determining the ‘effi ciency’ . . . 
of any project enabled by eminent domain is diffi cult at best, given the multiplicity 
of a project’s possible costs and benefi ts, the length of the relevant time horizons, and 
so on.”).
67 See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 197 (cited in note 4) (asserting that “nothing pre-
vents municipalities and private interests from using infl ated estimates of economic 
benefi ts to justify condemnations”); Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 28 (cited in note 23) 
(pointing out that private parties may “intentionally exaggerate the expected bene-
fi ts of a taking for the purpose of obtaining the state’s condemnation authority”); see 
notwithstanding these benefi ts, private involvement is not justifi ed 
because of the countervailing risk that the taking’s asserted pur-
pose is pretextual. The only question then would be distinguishing 
between public benefi ts that are “substantial” and those that are 
“incidental.”
The public benefi ts test, however, suffers from several additional 
shortcomings. By focusing only on the magnitude of public bene-
fi ts, the test seems to ignore the magnitude of private benefi ts. Yet 
private benefi ts seem relevant. Suppose that an assembly project is 
expected to add 50 new jobs, $400,000 in tax revenue, and 20 units of 
affordable housing. If landowners challenged the local government’s 
use of eminent domain to assemble the land, a court might reject 
a pretext defense if the private developer was expected to obtain a 
benefi t of only $10,000. However, a court could, and probably should, 
view the case differently if the developer was expected to obtain a 
benefi t of $1 million. But neither Justice Stevens nor Justice Kennedy 
mentions the magnitude of private benefi ts as a potential factor. As 
a result, two takings with the same expected public benefi ts presum-
ably would be judged similarly even though they differ dramatically 
with regard to the expected private benefi ts.
Perhaps an even more fundamental problem with the public bene-
fi ts test is that the test relies on “projected” public benefi ts. In Kelo, 
Justice Kennedy focused on the fact that the “projected economic 
benefi ts of the project cannot be characterized as de minimis.”64 
Likewise, in Franco, the D.C. Court of Appeals emphasized that “a 
reviewing court must focus primarily on the benefi ts the public hopes 
to realize from the proposed taking.”65 A test based on projected bene-
fi ts is likely to prove vacuous in most circumstances. Not only is 
it extremely diffi cult to estimate a project’s expected benefi ts,66 but 
both the condemnor and the private benefi ciaries of a condemnation 
have an incentive to infl ate projected benefi ts to insulate the con-
demnation from scrutiny.67 Consequently, for almost any assembly 
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also Gillette, 34 Hofstra L Rev at 20 (cited in note 24) (describing the government’s 
“incentive for undue optimism” because “there is little reason for local offi cials not 
to forecast the fi nancially rosiest of futures for those parcels, since doing so gains 
political support for the project, allowing them to take credit for what is described as 
the impending economic boom”).
68 See Kelo, 545 US at 504 (O’Connor dissenting) (contending that neither the 
Court’s rule nor Justice Kennedy’s “gloss” on that rule is a meaningful restraint on 
private takings “[i]f legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefi ts 
of a new use can legitimate a taking”); cf. Supreme Court 2004 Term, Leading Cases, 
Public Use—Economic Development, 119 Harv L Rev 287, 294 (2005) (asserting that 
the majority’s test is “unlikely to have much bite: a reasonably creative legislator 
will almost always be able to tell a story that connects a given taking with a projected 
public benefi t, particularly when a court will defer to her characterization of a purpose 
as public”).
69 Kelo, 545 US at 487; see also Brief of Petitioners, Kelo v City of New London, 
Civil Action No 04-108, *36 (US fi led Dec 3, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 
2811059) (“The condemnation of property for economic development projects should 
only occur if and when the government can show that there is reasonable certainty 
that the project will proceed and yield the public benefi ts that are used to justify the 
condemnation.”).
70 467 US 229 (1984).
71 See Kelo, 545 US at 488 (“When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its 
means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom 
of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic 
legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.” (quoting Midkiff, 467 US 
at 242-43)); see also George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings After Kelo: What’s Blight 
Got to Do With It?, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just 803, 812 (2008) (“The Court will not hear 
arguments that the plan’s means are unlikely to lead to the plan’s stated goals, or even 
that the goals are unrealistic and unattainable.” (citing Kelo, 545 US at 488)).
72 Cf. Mahoney, 2005 Sup Ct Rev at 117-18 (cited in note 7) (“This last statement—
expressing confi dence that courts will be able to readily identify takings that have no 
project, local offi cials could provide an estimate that purports to 
demonstrate the potential for signifi cant public benefi ts.68
Indeed, to rely on a test based on the magnitude of projected public 
benefi ts (or even the anticipated ratio of public to private benefi ts) 
makes little sense in light of the Supreme Court’s explicit rejection of 
a “reasonable certainty” requirement in Kelo. The petitioners in Kelo 
argued that, in examining economic development takings, the Court 
should “require a ‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public 
benefi ts will actually accrue.”69 In rejecting this argument, the Court 
noted that such a rule would represent a departure from precedent, 
particularly the Court’s admonition in Hawaii Housing Authority 
v. Midkiff 70 that federal courts are not the appropriate place for em-
pirical debates about the wisdom of takings.71 In light of the Court’s 
own skepticism regarding a reasonable certainty requirement, evalu-
ating pretext by relying on a factor that requires a judicial determina-
tion of expected benefi ts seems problematic.72
This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:52:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Daniel B. Kelly 189
conceivable public purpose other than to generate additional taxes—to some degree 
undermines the earlier claim that there is no practicable way to distinguish economic 
development takings from other exercises of the eminent domain power.”).
73 Kelo, 545 US at 478 (quoting Kelo v City of New London, 843 A2d 500, 536 (Conn. 
2004) (emphasis added)).
74 Id at 487 (emphasis added).
75 Id at 493 (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added).
76 See Nicole Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 Ecology L Q 443, 444 (2007) 
(“The Kelo majority mentioned the words ‘plan’ or ‘planning’ forty times; Justice Ken-
nedy’s separate opinion brought the tally to nearly fi fty.”).
77 Compare Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v Valsamaki, 916 A2d 324, 
351-52 & n 26 (Md 2007) (invalidating quick- take condemnation because, inter alia, 
city had “no plan for the development of the Property”) with W. Seafood Co. v United 
States, 2006 US App LEXIS 25520, *13, 2006 WL 2920809, **4 (5th Cir 2006) (“The 
proposed taking of Western Seafood’s property is the result of a carefully considered 
The ultimate problem with a test based on the magnitude of pro-
jected public benefi ts is thus one of administrability. It is extremely 
diffi cult for a court to estimate the projected public benefi ts of a pro-
posed taking. It is also extremely diffi cult for a court to estimate 
the potential private benefi ts of a proposed taking. Relying on these 
types of projections, therefore, fails to provide an effective safeguard 
for ensuring that a local government’s asserted purpose is not pre-
textual.
2. Extensiveness of Planning and Process
Although not mentioning the public benefi ts factor, the majority 
opinion in Kelo did emphasize the importance of “planning” in 
evaluating whether a taking is pretextual. The Court directly jux-
taposed pretext and planning. It concluded that, while New London 
would not be allowed to take property under the “mere pretext” of a 
public purpose, the takings at issue “would be executed pursuant to 
a ‘carefully considered’ development plan.”73 The Court also noted 
that, while not presented in this case, “a one- to-one transfer of prop-
erty, executed outside the confi nes of an integrated development 
plan, . . . would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was 
afoot . . . .”74 Similarly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy 
asserted that one of the reasons that a more demanding standard of 
review was unnecessary was that the condemnations “occurred in 
the context of a comprehensive development plan . . . .”75 In a recent 
article examining Kelo’s emphasis on planning, Nicole Garnett 
points out that the majority and concurring opinions mention the 
words “plan” or “planning” nearly fi fty times.76
The existence of a development plan has been relevant in sev-
eral post- Kelo cases.77 Perhaps most notably, in Didden v. Village 
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development plan.”). But cf. MiPro Homes, L.L.C. v Mount Laurel Twp, 878 A2d 38, 
44 (NJ Super 2005) (concluding that a municipality may exercise authority to condemn 
property for open space “even though it does not presently have a plan to devote the 
property to active recreational uses”), aff’d 910 A2d 617 (NJ 2006) (per curiam).
78 304 F Supp 2d 548 (SDNY 2004), aff’d 2006 US App LEXIS 8653, 2006 WL 898093 
(2d Cir 2006).
79 Id at 551.
80 Id at 556. The court initially denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion and concluded that Plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on their takings claim. See 
id at 559. The court asserted that, because the redevelopment project “serves a clear 
public purpose—the redevelopment of the blighted downtown area of Port Chester,” 
the “alleged ‘bribe’ by Private Defendants, even if it was a ‘bad faith’ offer, could not 
in any way have transformed that public purpose into a private purpose.” Id. The court 
also noted that it could not “get involved in parsing the particular degree of public 
or private motivation behind the inclusion of a particular site in the Project area, so 
long as that inclusion could rationally be related to the public purpose of the plan as a 
whole.” Id (quoting Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc v New York State Urban Develop-
ment Corp, 605 F Supp 612 (SDNY), aff’d, 771 F2d 44, 45 (2d Cir 1985)).
81 Didden v Village of Port Chester, 322 F Supp 2d 385, 390 (SDNY 2004).
82 Didden, 2006 US App LEXIS 8653, *4-5, 2006 WL 898093, **2.
83 See Amicus Brief of Law Professors D. Benjamin Barros, et al, Didden v Village of 
Port Chester, Civil Action No 06-652, *4 (US fi led Dec 8, 2006) (available on Westlaw 
at 2006 WL 3610985) (“Law Professors Amicus Brief”) (“If the Court allows clearly 
pretextual condemnations to go forward merely because they occur within a redevel-
opment area, then the proliferation of these areas will open the door to widespread 
abuses of political power.”); cf. Garnett, 34 Ecology L Q at 453-54 (cited in note 76) 
(concluding that “the majority opinion in Kelo and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
suggest that planning almost always precludes a fi nding of pretext” and that “it is 
fairly clear that Kelo proceeds on the assumption that planning and pretext are usually 
incompatible”).
of Port Chester,78 storeowner Bart Didden and several landowners 
(collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) sued Port Chester and several Private 
Defendants, including the Village’s preferred developer, to prevent 
the use of eminent domain for a redevelopment project.79 The Plain-
tiffs alleged that the “Private Defendants demanded that Plaintiffs 
either pay them $800,000 or give them a partnership interest in the 
project or Private Defendants would cause Port Chester to com-
mence a condemnation proceeding” against their property.80 The 
district court held that Plaintiffs’ primary claims were time- barred 
but that, in any event, the “allegation of an extortionate demand of 
$800,000 to avoid condemnation adds nothing of legal signifi cance 
to Plaintiffs’ claims.”81 On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded 
that, even if Plaintiffs’ claims were not time- barred, Kelo precludes 
these claims “to the extent that they assert that the Takings Clause 
prevents the State from condemning their property for a private use 
within a redevelopment district . . . .”82 The court appeared to be sug-
gesting that, because these condemnations had occurred within a 
“redevelopment district,” Kelo effectively insulates the takings from 
a public use challenge.83
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84 See Amicus Brief of the American Planning Association, et al, Kelo v. City of New 
London, Civil Action No 04-108, *26 (US fi led Jan 21, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 
2005 WL 166929) (“APA Amicus Brief”) (“To the extent the need to undertake a plan-
ning process including public participation magnifi es the cost differential between 
eminent domain and market transactions, these processes also provide a further dis-
incentive to use eminent domain.”).
85 See Garnett, 34 Ecology L Q at 460 (cited in note 76) (“Planning takes time . . . .”).
86 See id. (pointing out that “the planning process may give property owners (and 
especially homeowners) an opportunity to organize so as to protect their interests”).
87 See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 57 (cited in note 24) (pointing out that for public-
 private redevelopment projects “the city might contribute . . . the land either for free 
or at below market value”); Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 37 (cited in note 23) (noting that 
private parties who benefi t from the use of eminent domain are “usually not required 
to pay any compensation to either the condemnees or the state” and discussing several 
examples where acquisition costs were nominal).
In theory, an emphasis on planning might reduce the number of 
pretextual takings. Planning might act as a fi ltering mechanism. By 
requiring local offi cials and private developers to engage in a certain 
level of planning, the public might obtain more information about 
the assembly and thus be more likely to identify a taking as pretex-
tual. Planning also might act as a deterrent mechanism. If local offi -
cials and private developers know that condemnations must occur 
within development plans and that the public is able to scrutinize 
these plans, they may hesitate before proposing projects that are not 
in the public interest. Furthermore, even if planning does not help 
to identify or deter pretextual takings, planning might increase the 
costs of relying on eminent domain. These costs may cause local gov-
ernments to rely on eminent domain less frequently in assembling 
land on behalf of private developers.84
Ultimately, planning is unlikely to provide an adequate test for 
identifying pretext. Planning’s primary effect is on the timing of the 
condemnations rather than the type of condemnations. Extensive 
planning increases the length of the process.85 However, while a longer 
process may provide property owners more time to organize politi-
cally,86 it does not necessarily provide a mechanism for distinguishing 
between legitimate and pretextual takings. Moreover, if planning did 
disclose that a taking was pretextual, it is doubtful that the sanction 
imposed on a private party, if any, would be signifi cant. Planning is 
thus unlikely to deter fi rms who are willing to threaten local offi -
cials with the possibility of relocating. Finally, although planning 
does increase an assembly’s costs, higher costs may not diminish 
a taking’s private benefi ts to such an extent that private develop-
ers would abandon their efforts to acquire eminent domain. Indeed, 
because planning costs usually will be borne by the government, not 
the developers themselves,87 a planning requirement may not deter 
developers from seeking eminent domain for their own objectives. 
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88 The case law presents two doctrinal complications with relying on planning as 
well. First, although the Supreme Court cited 99 Cents Only as being problematic 
because of the absence of planning, the condemnation in 99 Cents Only actually did 
occur pursuant to a development plan. See note 4 (citing 99 Cents Only Stores v Lan-
caster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F Supp 2d 1123, 1125 (CD Cal 2001)). The Court’s 
citation to 99 Cents Only raises the question of whether all condemnations within 
a plan are incompatible with a fi nding of pretext or only a subset of condemnations 
within a plan; alternatively, the Court’s concern with the type of condemnation at 
issue in 99 Cents Only may have been less about the existence of a development plan 
and more about the fact that the taking was “a one- to-one transfer of property.” Id; 
see also Part V(B)(6) (discussing one- to-one takings). Second, if a development plan is 
indeed all that is required to immunize a taking from being evaluated for a pretextual 
motivation, then planning could create a zone free from judicial review. Petitioners 
in Didden pointed out this apparent anomaly in seeking to persuade the Supreme 
Court to issue a writ of certiorari. See Petition for Certiorari, Didden v Village of Port 
Chester, Civil Action No 06-652, *10 (US fi led Nov 7, 2006) (available on Westlaw at 
2006 WL 3265594) (“If the Second Circuit’s interpretation is allowed to stand, it will 
effectively insulate condemnations in redevelopment areas from judicial review.”); 
see also supra note 83.
89 Kelo, 545 US at 493. Here, Justice Kennedy seemed to be adopting an argument 
from the American Planning Association’s amicus brief, which Thomas Merrill and 
John Echeverria co-authored. See APA Amicus Brief, *24 (cited in note 84). In their brief, 
Merrill and Echeverria point out that “[e]minent domain is generally more expensive 
[than market purchase] because the power is cabined by a variety of procedural require-
ments that entail signifi cant cost and delay for agencies seeking to acquire resources.” 
Id. They thus suggest that “the most constructive contribution courts can make in 
protecting against misuse or overuse of eminent domain is to insist that the procedural 
requirements associated with the exercise of eminent domain be faithfully followed in 
every case.” Id at 25; see also David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 
206 (Foundation Press, 2002) (“In effect, the imposition of the due process tax makes 
the exercise of eminent domain largely self- regulating: It will be used only where the 
surplus to the taker is greater than the due process tax.”). 
90 See notes 12 & 84; see also APA Amicus Brief at *25 (cited in note 84) (“Strict 
enforcement of procedural requirements . . . makes eminent domain largely self-
 regulating, in the sense that it will only be used in situations where the costs of nego-
tiated exchange are prohibitive.”).
In any event, while additional costs may decrease the government’s 
reliance on eminent domain, they do not help to distinguish between 
situations in which private involvement is necessary and situations 
in which it may be pretextual.88
In addition to emphasizing planning, Justice Kennedy focused 
on the related issue of the condemnor’s compliance with eminent 
domain’s procedural requirements. Kennedy noted that New London 
had “complied with elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate 
review of the record and inquiry into the city’s purposes.”89 While 
enforcing procedural requirements does increase the costs of emi-
nent domain and thereby encourages reliance on market exchange,90 
procedure, like planning, does not provide a mechanism for distin-
guishing between takings in which private involvement is legitimate 
and takings in which private involvement is pretextual. Indeed, pro-
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91 Cf. Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 816 (1996) (noting that “it is a long leap 
from the proposition that following regular procedures is some evidence of lack of 
pretext to the proposition that failure to follow regular procedures proves (or is an 
operational substitute for) pretext”).
92 See Kelo, 545 US at 502 (O’Connor dissenting) (“Whatever the details of Justice 
Kennedy’s as- yet- undisclosed test, it is diffi cult to envision anyone but the ‘stupid 
staff[er]’ failing it.” (citing Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 
1025-26 n 12 (1992) (alteration in Kelo))).
93 Cf. Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 236 (cited in note 4) (“Even if the jurisdiction in 
question did not initially intend to adopt a plan, after Kelo, it would surely choose to 
do so in order to insulate itself from legal challenge.”).
94 Kelo, 545 US at 478 n 6; see also id (explaining that “while the City intends 
to transfer certain of the parcels to a private developer in a long- term lease—which 
developer, in turn, is expected to lease the offi ce space and so forth to other private 
tenants—the identities of those private parties were not known when the plan was 
adopted”).
cedural regularity is an imperfect proxy for the absence of pretext 
because, even assuming that due process costs would be borne by 
private developers (rather than local governments), developers may 
be willing to bear signifi cant due process costs to obtain windfall 
benefi ts. Conversely, procedural irregularity is an imperfect proxy 
for the presence of pretext because a defi ciency in process does not 
necessarily mean that the taking itself is pretextual.91
The ultimate problem with relying on planning or process is thus 
one of futility. A local government that wishes to use the power of 
eminent domain on behalf of a private developer can easily do so, 
even if the taking is pretextual, simply by incorporating the taking 
into a comprehensive development plan and following the requisite 
procedural requirements.92 Moreover, if a court invalidates a taking 
based on a lack of planning or a defi ciency in procedure, local offi -
cials can accomplish the same objective simply by reauthorizing the 
condemnation within a more comprehensive development plan or 
using more stringent procedural requirements.93 Likewise, while 
planning and procedural requirements do increase the costs of emi-
nent domain, these requirements may be futile if a private developer 
(or the local government on behalf of a developer) is still willing to 
pay these costs to obtain the resulting private benefi ts.
3. Identifi cation of Private Parties
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy both suggested that the condem-
nations at issue in Kelo were not pretextual for an additional reason: 
the identities of the private benefi ciaries were not known until after 
the development plan was adopted. Stevens asserted that it is “diffi -
cult to accuse the government of having taken A’s property to benefi t 
the private interests of B when the identity of B was unknown.”94 
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95 Id at 491-92 (Kennedy concurring).
96 Id at 493. The timing concerning the identifi cation of private parties is actually 
somewhat complicated in Kelo. Plaintiffs alleged that the project’s primary benefi ciary 
was not the developer who would lease the assembled land or other private parties 
who might rent offi ce space but rather Pfi zer Corporation, which recently opened a 
global research facility nearby. The Court asserted that the New London Development 
Corporation (NLDC) intended for the development plan “to capitalize on the arrival 
of the Pfi zer facility and the new commerce it was expected to attract.” Id at 474. The 
dissenters viewed the relationship differently, noting that the city council approved 
the NLDC’s development plan just two months after Pfi zer had announced that it 
would build its new facility. See id at 495 (O’Connor dissenting).
97 516 F3d 50 (2d Cir 2008).
98 Id at 53. Plans for the site include a new professional basketball stadium, sixteen 
high- rise apartment towers, several offi ce towers, and the creation of a public open 
space. Id.
99 Id at 55-56. Specifi cally, plaintiffs alleged “that [Ratner], not a state agency, fi rst 
conceived of developing Atlantic Yards, that the Ratner Group proposed the geo-
graphic boundaries of the Project, and that it was [Ratner’s] plan for the Project that 
the ESDC [Empire State Development Corporation] eventually adopted without sig-
nifi cant modifi cation.” Id.
100 Id at 64.
Likewise, Kennedy pointed out that the trial court had considered 
testimony indicating that “the substantial commitment of public 
funds by the State to the development project [had occurred] before 
most of the private benefi ciaries were known” and that “the other 
private benefi ciaries of the project are still unknown because the 
offi ce space proposed to be built has not yet been rented.”95 Kennedy 
also maintained that a more demanding level of scrutiny was unnec-
essary because “[t]he identities of most of the private benefi ciaries 
[we]re unknown at the time the city formulated its plans.”96
However, a recent case from the Second Circuit, Goldstein v. 
Pataki,97 suggests that lower courts may not believe that the timing 
of the identifi cation of private parties is decisive. Goldstein involved 
the Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project, a twenty- two 
acre, multibillion dollar assembly in downtown Brooklyn.98 Plain-
tiffs, fi fteen property owners, contended that Bruce Ratner, the proj-
ect’s primary developer, and his development fi rm, Forest City Ratner 
Companies, were the actual impetus behind the project.99 On appeal, 
the Second Circuit noted that the “sequence of events was certainly 
one of the factors considered in Kelo” and also observed that, “unlike 
in Kelo, the Atlantic Yards Project was allegedly proposed in the 
fi rst instance by Ratner himself.”100 Yet the court, quoting a New 
York state case, quickly dismissed this concern and asserted that 
“New York long ago decided by statute not to restrict [a development 
corporation’s] mandate to those ‘projects in which it is the prime 
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101 Id (quoting E Thirteenth St Cmty Ass’n v NY State Hous Fin Agency, 218 AD2d 
512, 513 (NY App Div 1st Dep’t 1995)).
102 But cf. Franco, 930 A2d at 175 (asserting that “nothing in Kelo suggests that the 
items of evidence mentioned there set constitutional standards”).
103 See Goldstein, 516 F3d at 65. By contrast, in Franco, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals explicitly credited plaintiff’s allegation that the revitalization corpo-
ration entered into a joint development agreement with a private developer two years 
before the introduction of the fi rst bill concerning the assembly. 930 A2d at 170-71.
104 Cf. Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 811 (cited in note 71) (pointing out, as a 
descriptive matter, that “most redevelopment authorities work closely with consul-
tants and private developers to identify private market users before acquiring land for 
redevelopment”); Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 57-58 (cited in note 24) (asserting, as a 
normative matter, that Justice Kennedy’s focus on “the timing of the identifi cation of 
the private benefi ciaries” is problematic because “it may be of fi nancial and strategic 
advantage to the public to have a master developer involved in the economic and 
physical planning of the site well before site acquisition is complete”).
mover.’ ”101 If Kelo’s discussion of pretext is based on federal constitu-
tional law, it is unclear why a New York state decision, interpreting 
New York law, would have any effect on the analysis.102 In any event, 
the court did not seem bothered by the sequence of events and ulti-
mately rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations of pretext.103
The intuition behind relying on the timing of the identifi cation of 
private parties is relatively straightforward. If a private party’s iden-
tity is unknown at the time of a development plan’s adoption, it is 
unlikely that the private party is the impetus behind the project. On 
the other hand, if a private party’s identity is known at the time of a 
development plan’s adoption, it is possible that the private party is 
the impetus behind the project. The Court’s emphasis on the identifi -
cation of private parties is thus a plausible criterion by which to judge 
whether a taking’s asserted purpose is a pretextual one. Moreover, 
if lower courts actually were to apply this factor, it may be more 
diffi cult for private developers to demand that local governments 
condemn particular sites as public- private coordination would be 
possible only after the adoption of a development plan.
The problem with this factor, however, is that it is potentially 
both underinclusive and overinclusive. It is sometimes unnecessary, 
even after the development plan is known, to rely on a particular 
preferred developer. Under these circumstances, if the government 
selects a preferred developer, it creates the possibility of impermis-
sible favoritism. This factor is thus potentially underinclusive. On 
the other hand, it may sometimes be necessary, even before the adop-
tion of the development plan, to rely on a particular private devel-
oper.104 Indeed, in certain situations, a private developer may have 
information that local offi cials do not have regarding the appropriate 
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105 See, for example, Middletown Twp v Lands of Stone, 939 A2d 331, 337 (Pa 2007) 
(“In considering whether a primary public purpose was properly invoked, this Court 
has looked for the ‘real or fundamental purpose’ behind a taking. Stated otherwise, the 
true purpose must primarily benefi t the public.” (citation omitted)); see also Oswald, 
35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 61 (cited in note 44) (“Some courts have . . . tried to address 
the issue by examining whether the purpose articulated by the condemnor is a real 
one, or is just a sham. This leads the court into convoluted issues of true versus stated 
purpose and raises the ill- defi ned role of bad faith in takings analysis.”). Below, I con-
sider another possibility: that the asserted purpose for the taking is not the actual 
purpose for the taking but the actual purpose is not to bestow a benefi t on a private 
party. See Part V(B)(7). While such a scenario is likely to arise rather infrequently, it is 
a possibility if the condemnor’s objective is to target a disfavored party rather than to 
benefi t a favored party. See id.
106 See Part II(B) (describing problem of “disutility”).
107 See id (describing problem of “futility”).
108 See id (describing problem of “administrability”).
site for an assembly project. As a result, this factor is potentially 
overinclusive as well.
Ultimately, the problem with relying exclusively on the timing 
of the identifi cation of private parties is one of disutility. This fac-
tor may permit certain takings involving post- condemnation private 
involvement by particular developers even where such involvement 
is unnecessary. Conversely, this factor may prohibit certain takings 
involving pre- condemnation private involvement even where such 
involvement may be necessary.
B. An Alternative Test Based on Intent
If the current framework is problematic, it is appropriate to consider 
alternative tests. One obvious possibility is to focus exclusively on 
the condemnor’s intent. In an ideal world in which motivation is per-
fectly observable, the test would be simple. If the condemnor asserts 
a public purpose for a taking and the condemnor’s asserted purpose 
for the taking is the actual purpose, then the condemnation is not 
pretextual. If the condemnor’s asserted purpose for the taking is not 
the actual purpose, and the actual purpose is to bestow a benefi t on a 
private party, then the condemnation is pretextual.105
However, a test based exclusively on a condemnor’s motivation 
is problematic for several reasons. As an initial matter, a condem-
nation that is invalidated merely on the basis of the condemnor’s 
intent may result in a social loss if the project is, in fact, welfare-
 enhancing.106 Moreover, because a condemnor usually does not dis-
close what is motivating a particular decision, a test based on intent 
may be futile.107 Finally, because the condemnor’s actual motivation 
is relatively diffi cult to determine, the test may not be judicially 
administrable.108
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109 See Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 59 (cited in note 44) (concluding that 
“courts generally view inquiries into the motives behind eminent domain actions as 
off- limits”).
110 Goldstein, 516 F3d at 63.
111 Franco, 930 A2d at 173.
112 Id at 173 n 12 (citations omitted); cf. Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at 
116 (cited in note 23) (pointing out that “courts have been quite reluctant to put too 
much stock in what local legislators say on the record, much less to take testimony 
about what the legislators might have been thinking when they cast their votes”).
113 476 US 79 (1986).
114 Id at 99.
115 508 US 520 (1993).
116 Id at 540.
117 517 US 806 (1996).
In practice, courts have been quite reluctant to investigate the 
underlying motivations of state legislators and local offi cials who 
authorize and exercise the eminent domain power.109 As the Second 
Circuit recently emphasized: “We do not read Kelo’s reference to 
‘pretext’ as demanding . . . a full judicial inquiry into the subjective 
motivation of every offi cial who supported the Project, an exercise 
as fraught with conceptual and practical diffi culties as with state-
 sovereignty and separation- of-power concerns.”110 The D.C. Court 
of Appeals has pointed out as well that, in evaluating whether a tak-
ing is pretextual, there are “formidable barriers to discovering the 
motives and intentions of individual legislators.”111 The benefi ts of 
discovery, for instance, may be minimal because normally “legis-
lators may not be deposed or made to answer interrogatories in an 
attempt to disclose their individual motivations.”112
Yet, at least as a descriptive matter, the diffi culty of determining 
motivation by itself does not seem to be a suffi cient reason for reject-
ing an intent- based test. The Supreme Court has approved similar 
inquiries in a number of contexts. For example, in Batson v. Ken-
tucky,113 the Court explicitly rejected the government’s argument 
that judicial inquiries into the purpose of prosecutors’ preemptory 
challenges would present serious administrative diffi culties.114 Simi-
larly, in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,115 the Court 
considered the motivation of city council members and emphasized 
that “we may determine the city council’s object from both direct 
and circumstantial evidence” including “the historical background 
of the decision under challenge, the specifi c series of events leading 
to the enactment or offi cial policy in question, and the legislative 
or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements 
made by members of the decisionmaking body.”116 Even in Whren v. 
United States,117 where the Court held that the constitutional rea-
sonableness of traffi c stops does not depend on the actual motiva-
tions of the individual offi cers involved, Justice Scalia, writing for 
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118 Id at 814.
119 See Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 61-62 (cited in note 44) (asserting that, 
“although the courts in theory eschew the notion that they can inquire into the 
motives underlying a taking, they in practice, by acknowledging a role for evaluating 
the condemnor’s actions for subterfuge or bad faith, open the door to at least limited 
inquiries about motive” (citing City of Evansville v Reising, 547 NE2d 1106, 1111 (Ind 
Ct App 1989))).
120 Cf. Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at 115 (cited in note 23) (noting that 
legislation “often is motivated by a complex myriad of purposes” and discussing three 
possible tests for “mixed motive” cases).
121 See William J. Stern, State Capitalism, New York Style, City J, 70-75 (Summer 
1994) (concluding that “the practice of ad hoc deal- making to induce particular com-
panies to stay is misguided” because “it creates an incentive for businesses to threaten 
to leave, even if they have no intention of doing so”), quoted in Ellickson & Been, Land 
Use Controls at 885 (cited in note 23); cf. Ralph Nader and Alan Hirsch, Making Emi-
nent Domain Humane, 49 Vill L Rev 207, 219 n 87 (2004) (asserting that “the notion 
that th[e] exercise of eminent domain [in Poletown] was valuable to Detroit’s economy 
is problematic” because “it was brought about by GM’s threat to relocate, which may 
have been a bluff” (citation omitted)). But cf. Steve Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and 
Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 S Ct Econ Rev 63, 104 (2009) (arguing that any test 
for pretext based on public benefi ts is likely to be futile because even in a case like 99 
Cents Only local offi cials genuinely did not want Costco to relocate).
a unanimous Court, noted that the Court’s prior cases in this area 
were not based only, or even principally, on the diffi culty of estab-
lishing subjective intent.118 In the takings context itself, courts have 
developed a number of tests including “bad faith” for analyzing a 
condemnor’s intent.119 
Perhaps an even more signifi cant concern with a test based exclu-
sively on intent is that a condemnor may have “mixed” motives.120 
The possibility of mixed motives is particularly likely when a fi rm 
threatens to relocate unless the local government utilizes eminent 
domain on its behalf. The problem arises because, before the reloca-
tion threat, local offi cials may not wish to condemn the land. Indeed, 
offi cials may view such a condemnation as a transfer that merely 
serves a private interest. However, after the relocation threat, offi cials 
may conclude that preventing the fi rm from relocating is essential 
and thus may decide to condemn the land for the fi rm. Paradoxically, 
therefore, offi cials may act in a way that is genuinely motivated by 
the public interest even though the purpose of the taking is solely for 
a private benefi t. But because these threats to relocate may decrease 
social welfare, takings such as the condemnations at issue in Pole-
town or 99 Cents Only should not be immune from judicial scrutiny 
even though, at the time of the takings, the condemnors may have 
been genuinely motivated by a public purpose.121
Hence, a test for pretext based exclusively on the condemnor’s 
intent arguably entails the problems of disutility, futility, and admin-
istrability. A test based solely on intent also would permit the use of 
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122 See Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 110-21 (cited in note 31) (pointing out that 
“Takers” have an incentive to avoid properties with high subjective values); see also 
Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 11 (cited in note 24) (“Agencies avoid acquisition of occu-
pied residential land, whether by negotiation or condemnation, because of the expense 
of relocation, and, in many situations, because of the risk of political controversy.”).
eminent domain even in situations—like the cases involving threats 
to relocate—that clearly entail impermissible favoritism. Conse-
quently, both the test proposed in Kelo and an intent- based test are 
unsatisfactory. What is needed is a framework that is able to target 
pretext more precisely.
I V.  W H E N  P R I VAT E  I N V O LV E M E N T  B E C O M E S 
P R E T E X T U A L
A. Two Stages of an Assembly
To establish a framework for identifying pretext, I fi rst examine 
the possible reasons for private involvement in the condemnation 
process. The primary justifi cation for such involvement is that the 
public might benefi t if private parties are able to assist the local gov-
ernment in executing a development project. Because private owner-
ship or control might increase the likelihood of a successful project, 
private parties may have a role in developing an assembly site. But 
private parties may have another role as well. Specifi cally, private 
parties may have information that the local government does not 
have regarding the optimal location for an assembly. Thus, private 
parties also may be useful in identifying the assembly site.
1. Identifying the Site
The fi rst stage of an assembly is identifying the relevant site. If the 
local government is seeking to assemble land for one of its own proj-
ects, government offi cials usually will have a belief about whether 
an assembly is necessary and, if so, where the assembly should take 
place. Suppose a town is considering building a new public school. 
Local offi cials might have information regarding the school’s optimal 
location. These offi cials also might have information regarding the 
costs of acquiring various parcels of land. If the best location for the 
school contained a number of homes and business, the government 
might have to pay a considerable sum either to purchase the land 
or to condemn the land and pay just compensation. Local offi cials 
might weigh the costs and benefi ts of this location against the costs 
and benefi ts of purchasing undeveloped land in a suitable yet sub-
optimal location.122
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123 See Heller and Hills, 121 Harv L Rev at 1480 (cited in note 35) (pointing out “the 
additional diffi culty of whether eminent domain sends to government and private 
condemnees an accurate signal of the relative value of preserving the status quo or 
assembling fragmented ownership patterns”); Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 25 (cited in 
note 23) (noting that the government “may believe (albeit mistakenly) that the private 
assembler values the land more than the existing owners” and, consequently, “may 
use eminent domain to force a transfer even though the existing owners value the land 
more than the assembler”).
124 Poletown Neighborhood Council v City of Detroit, 304 NW2d 455, 467 (Mich 
1981) (Ryan dissenting).
125 160 US 668 (1896).
126 See id at 670.
By contrast, when a private party seeks to assemble land for a 
private project, the local government may not know whether the 
assembly is desirable or, if it is desirable, where the assembly should 
take place. Suppose that a corporation wants to assemble land for 
a new factory. Local offi cials may not know whether an assembly 
is necessary to build the factory.123 Moreover, even if these offi cials 
believe the assembly is necessary, the offi cials may not know the 
optimal location for the assembly. The corporation may have partic-
ular specifi cations regarding the parcel’s size and shape, its proximity 
to roads and other instrumentalities of commerce, and its location in 
relation to the potential labor force.
A private party could share this information with the government. 
For example, in Poletown, General Motors had a number of specifi -
cations that it announced were necessary for its new facility. GM 
“told the city that it must fi nd or assemble a parcel 450 to 500 acres 
in size with access to long- haul railroad lines and a freeway system 
with railroad marshalling yards within the plant site.”124 However, 
whenever a private party such as GM shares information with local 
offi cials, the offi cials are relying on the private party’s own repre-
sentations and estimates. The actual value of these specifi cations 
is usually a fact that is known only by the company, not the gov-
ernment. In relying on this information, local offi cials take a risk 
regarding the desirability of the project unless the representations 
and estimates are capable of being independently verifi ed.
To be sure, certain assemblies may have to occur in particular lo-
cations because of the nature of the project. For example, in United 
States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Company,125 the federal gov-
ernment sought to acquire land at the Gettysburg battlefi eld. In that 
case, the location of the battlefi eld itself determined the site of the 
assembly.126 Similarly, in a town containing only one hill for a tele-
phone tower, the local government might know that the hill is the 
optimal site for a company attempting to provide mobile telephone 
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127 See, for example, Williams v Hyrum Gibbons & Sons, 602 P2d 684 (Utah 1979).
128 Id at 685.
129 Cf. Heller and Hills, 121 Harv L Rev at 1492-94 (cited in note 35) (differentiating 
between target fragmentation and target uniqueness).
130 348 US 26, 33-34 (1954).
131 Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 486 (2005) (quoting Berman, 348 US at 
33-34); cf. Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 54 (cited in note 24) (“Cities recognize . . . that 
while they can facilitate or oversee much of the redevelopment, they are not equipped 
to take on many aspects of the effort.”).
and radio paging services.127 However, even this type of determina-
tion may require “extensive study and testing” to determine the 
optimal location.128 Of course, many other assembly projects do not 
require a unique site.129
The importance of this stage, identifying the optimal assembly 
site, is thus generally underappreciated. Disputes over eminent do-
main typically attract widespread attention only after a case is liti-
gated. The view of courts, as well as the public, is thus likely to 
be from an ex post perspective. Indeed, while courts often focus on 
whether the post- condemnation use of a parcel is a “public purpose,” 
they often do not consider the possible legal signifi cance of the pre-
 condemnation process of identifying the site.
2. Developing the Site
The government also may rely on private parties to develop an as-
sembly site. As noted above, the traditional justifi cation for private 
involvement is that private developers are likely to be more effec-
tive than the government at executing certain projects. Writing for 
a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Douglas emphasized in Ber-
man v. Parker that “[t]he public end may be as well or better served 
through an agency of private enterprise than through a department 
of government—or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say 
that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public 
purposes of community redevelopment projects.”130 Over fi fty years 
later, the Kelo Court reiterated this justifi cation for private involve-
ment.131
Private development of a site can take a number of forms. Private 
involvement may be limited to assisting local offi cials with the 
construction or implementation of a public project. For example, a 
county that is building a new courthouse might hire a private archi-
tect, a private engineering fi rm, and a private construction company 
to complete the project. This type of project, although relying on 
private parties, entails the same type of public- private coordination 
that occurs for any government contract in which a private party may 
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132 See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 59 (cited in note 24) (“In some cases, a contract 
formalizes this agency relationship such that the developer simply performs its obliga-
tions for a negotiated fee.”).
133 See generally Lani A. Perlman, Note, Guarding the Government’s Coffers: The 
Need For Competition Requirements to Safeguard Federal Government’s Procure-
ment, 75 Fordham L Rev 3187, 3187 (2007) (“The rules controlling the federal govern-
ment’s allocation of $350 billion in contracts emphasize competition as a safeguard 
against collusion between government buyers and private sellers.”).
134 See, for example, Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban 
Development in the 21st Century, 22 Ga St U L Rev 895, 901 (2006) (“As part of the 
effort to prevent General Motors from building elsewhere, the city [of Detroit] spent 
over $200 million to acquire and prepare the property, which it sold to the company 
for $8 million.”).
135 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public- Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 
Geo Wash L Rev 936, 980 (2003) (“Obviously, if a private party received an unencum-
bered fee simple title to condemned land, it is free to change the use of the land at any 
time.”); see also Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 53 n 247 (cited in note 23) (pointing out 
that “a private party may not use the condemned land in a manner consistent with 
the original public purpose”).
136 See Garnett, 71 Geo Wash L Rev at 981 (cited in note 135) (“[T]he government 
might retain title to the land but enter into a long term lease providing that the private 
party use the land for the intended public purpose.”); Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 39 
n 180 (cited in note 24) (“Ground leases are effective tools in redevelopment because 
they reduce or eliminate developers’ up front land costs and enable redevelopment 
agencies to maintain control over a project after completion.” (citing David F. Beatty 
et al Redevelopment in California 153 (Solano Press Books, 2d ed. 1995))). It is also pos-
receive an indirect benefi t.132 Typically, to the extent such involve-
ment raises concerns about favoritism, these concerns can be miti-
gated by competitive bidding and other mechanisms that reduce the 
likelihood of corruption and private infl uence.133
However, instead of continuing to own the property itself, a local 
government may decide to transfer the land in fee simple to a private 
party. For example, the government might condemn several blighted 
parcels, assemble the properties, and transfer the land to a private 
developer to build condominiums or offi ce buildings. Often this 
transfer is made for a nominal sum.134 Private involvement of this 
sort gives a developer complete control over the site. If the developer 
initially proposed a particular project to local offi cials, the developer 
may continue with that project after the transfer. But the devel-
oper also might decide to terminate the project and use the land for a 
different purpose or even to sell the land for a profi t.135 Generally, this 
type of private involvement raises concerns about pretext because 
local offi cials retain no control over the site and private parties may 
obtain a signifi cant benefi t.
When a local government wants a private party to use or develop a 
site, but still wants to retain ownership of the land, the government 
may decide to lease the land to a private party.136 Such leases are 
This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:52:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Daniel B. Kelly 203
sible that the government could condemn only a leasehold interest and then transfer 
that interest to a private party. Cf. Carol L. Zeiner, Establishing a Leasehold Through 
Eminent Domain: A Slippery Slope Made More Treacherous by Kelo, 56 Cath U L 
Rev 503, 505 (2007) (suggesting that it may be “time for governmental entities to seri-
ously consider using eminent domain to acquire less than a fee simple interest in real 
property when the specifi c need is important, of a limited—rather than an indefi nite—
duration, and a bargained- for exchange cannot be negotiated”).
137 See, for example, Kelo, 545 US at 476 n 4 (noting that the development corpora-
tion “was negotiating a 99-year ground lease with Corcoran Jennison” and that “[t]he 
negotiations contemplated a nominal rent of $1 per year”).
138 See, for example, id at 486 n 15 (“Notably, as in the instant case, the private 
developers in Berman were required by contract to use the property to carry out the 
redevelopment plan.” (citing Berman, 348 US at 30)). For a description of other ways in 
which the government might be able to ensure that a private party carries out a public 
purpose, see Garnett, 71 Geo Wash L Rev at 980-81 (cited in note 135).
139 See Garnett, 71 Geo Wash L Rev at 981 (cited in note 135) (“Under these circum-
stances, the abandonment of the public purpose would be considered a material breach 
and grounds for termination of the lease.”).
140 See id at 978 (“A number of states have considered or adopted ‘clawback’ legis-
lation penalizing the recipient of development incentives for failing to follow through 
on promised investment or job creation.”).
141 See Donald E. Sanders and Patricia Pattison, The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 Real 
Estate LJ 157, 167 (2005) (“If it is true that generally the free market delivers goods and 
services more effi ciently than the government, then it is more effi cient for the govern-
ment to condemn the property and then transfer it to a private party for the economic 
development.”); see also Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 40 (cited in note 24) (concluding 
that “government has come to appreciate that developers have capabilities that gov-
ernment does not share” and listing a number of these capabilities including “certain 
project or building- specifi c planning expertise, development, construction, leasing 
and sometimes maintenance expertise”).
frequently long- term leases (often, for ninety- nine years), and lease 
payments may be nominal as well.137 Some public- private leases con-
tain provisions that restrict the private party’s use of the land.138 If the 
private party deviates from the lease’s terms, the deviation may con-
stitute a material breach of the agreement.139 Some states also have 
enacted “clawback” statutes. If a public purpose is not being realized, 
these statutes allow government offi cials to reacquire control of a 
property.140 As with private ownership, however, a long- term lease 
raises concerns about pretext because, while the government retains 
an ownership interest, the private lessee usually exercises signifi cant 
control over the site and may obtain a substantial benefi t.
The government’s reliance on private enterprise is premised on 
the view that the private sector is more effi cient in executing cer-
tain projects.141 Yet private involvement in developing the site means 
that a private party is able to obtain a distinct benefi t. Indeed, being 
selected as a private developer entails the possibility of windfall prof-
its, especially if the developer buys or leases the land for a nominal 
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142 See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 37-39 (cited in note 23) (describing problem of 
costless acquisition).
143 See id at 39 (noting that private developers “will have a powerful incentive to use 
almost any means—including intensive lobbying, political contributions, expensive 
lawyers, threats to relocate, and sometimes even bribery—to obtain the takings power 
for their own private objectives”).
144 Cf. Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 39 (cited in note 24) (noting that “[m]odern devel-
opment mixes government and private ownership in arrangements that defeat any 
bright- line test”). Here, I use the term “development” rather than “ownership” to 
emphasize that the relevant inquiry is not whether a public or private entity formally 
owns the land but whether a public or private entity is the primary gatekeeper and 
benefi ciary of the property. Cf. id at 41 (arguing that “it is much too simple to talk 
about ‘ownership’ because the proverbial bundle of sticks associated with land owner-
ship has been deliberately broken apart and replaced with a pattern of contractual 
responsibilities that allocates to the respective public and private parties the specifi c 
elements of assembly, clearance, construction, maintenance, and control they are best 
equipped to perform for the subject development”).
sum.142 A private party thus has an incentive to lobby the govern-
ment, to outmaneuver other private parties, and to threaten reloca-
tion in order to obtain the power of eminent domain.143
B. Four Categories of Takings
Because an assembly project consists of two stages, the identifi ca-
tion stage and the development stage, private involvement is pos-
sible before the taking has occurred, after the taking has occurred, 
or both before and after the taking has occurred. Obviously, it is also 
possible for the government to exercise eminent domain without 
private involvement. The result is four types of takings (represented 
below in Figure 1) that involve varying degrees of public and private 
involvement.
The columns in Figure 1 indicate the source that provides the 
information by which a particular assembly site is identifi ed. Thus, 
Column 1 (“Public Information”) means that the government itself 
has information regarding the optimal site. Column 2 (“Private 
Information”) means that the government has to rely on one or more 
private parties to provide information regarding the site. The rows in 
Figure 1 indicate the identity of the developer. Thus, Row 1 (“Public 
Development”) means that the government itself continues to own 
the land and ultimately executes the project. Row 2 (“Private Devel-
opment”) means that the government sells or leases the land to one 
or more private parties and these parties ultimately control the prop-
erty and execute the project.
Of course, the line between “public development” and “private 
development” is not always clear.144 For example, a local government 
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145 See id at 38 (“Public uses are intermingled with private uses in the same develop-
ment, in the same building, and even the same space within a building.” (citing Todd W. 
Bressi, Planning the American Dream, in Peter Katz, The New Urbanism: Toward an 
Architecture of Community, xxx- xxxv (McGraw- Hill 1994))).
146 545 US at 474.
147 See id at 478 n 6 (acknowledging that “the City intends to transfer certain of 
the parcels to a private developer in a long- term lease—which developer, in turn, is 
expected to lease the offi ce space and so forth to other private tenants”).
148 But cf. In re Seattle, 638 P2d 549, 556 (Wash 1981) (en banc) (“If a private use is 
combined with a public use in such a way that the two cannot be separated, the right 
of eminent domain cannot be invoked.”).
149 For a different categorization, see Debra Pogrund Stark, How Do You Solve a 
Problem Like In Kelo?, 40 J Marshall L Rev 609, 612 (2007) (analyzing three categories 
of takings—(i) a “ ‘traditional taking’ where the government will own the land taken,” 
(ii) a “non- traditional taking where a private party will own the land taken,” and (iii) 
a traditional taking or non- traditional taking “where the land taken is the property 
owner’s home”—and proposing an increasing level of scrutiny for each category).
may use eminent domain for a revitalization project that includes 
both condominiums and offi ce towers (quintessential private develop-
ments) and streets and parks (quintessential public developments).145 
However, the line here is a functional, rather than formal, one, and 
most developments can be categorized as either public or private. For 
example, the project in Kelo included a “public walkway” and “state 
park,”146 yet most observers, including the justices in the majority, 
characterized the project as a private development.147 As a general 
matter, it seems plausible to assume that courts are usually capable 
of distinguishing between public and private developments.148
The two ways of acquiring information (public and private) and 
the two types of developers (public and private) yield four possibili-
ties. First, an assembly may be based on public information and rely 
on public development (Category 1). Second, an assembly may be 
based on private information and rely on public development (Cat-
egory 2). Third, an assembly may be based on public information and 
utilize a private developer (Category 3). Fourth, an assembly may be 
based on private information and utilize a private developer (Cat-
egory 4). I examine each of these possibilities in turn.149
Public Information Private Information
Public Development Category 1 Category 2
Private Development Category 3 Category 4
Figure 1. Four Categories of Takings
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150 Id at 635 (noting that “even a literal public use—where the public has the right 
to use of the property taken—could serve as a pretext for a taking really designed to 
benefi t a private party”).
151 See, for example, Union Lime Co. v Chicago & Nw Ry Co., 233 US 211, 222 
(1914) (“There is a clear distinction between spurs which are owned and operated by 
a common carrier as a part of its system and under its public obligation and merely 
private sidings.” (collecting cases)).
152 Indeed, many governmental actions involve both winners and losers in the 
private sector, but these actions do not involve the same type of impermissible favor-
itism as takings that directly benefi t a particular party. See generally Abraham Bell and 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L J 547 (2001).
1. Public Information—Public Development
If an assembly project is based on public information and executed 
by a public development, the risk that the taking is pretextual is 
minimal. The reason is that there is no private involvement in either 
identifying or developing the assembly site. Private involvement is 
unnecessary for identifying the site because the determination of the 
optimal site is based on the government’s own information. Private 
involvement is also unnecessary for developing the site because the 
government, rather than a private party, is capable of executing the 
development.
Consequently, there is usually little concern about impermissible 
favoritism in traditional government takings. When a local govern-
ment takes land for a public park, the government decides where 
the park will be located. After the assembly is complete, the govern-
ment continues to own and operate the park. Individuals who enjoy 
exercising outdoors may frequent the park more than others. Resi-
dents who own parcels near the park may have their property values 
increase while others may not. But the park itself is open to all, and 
there is no single private party that receives a concentrated benefi t.
For this category of takings, the risk of pretext is appropriately 
characterized as “minimal” (rather than zero) because it is possible 
that a public development based on public information could still be 
pretextual. Specifi cally, even if no private party is involved in identi-
fying the site and the government continues to own and control the 
land, the government might use eminent domain to benefi t a particu-
lar private party.150 For example, the government might condemn land 
in order to build a railroad line whose only destination is a private 
company at the end of the track. With regard to this type of project, 
the private benefi ciary is usually readily apparent. Perhaps as a result, 
there is already a fairly well- developed jurisprudence for determining 
whether such a project is for a public or private purpose.151 Of course, 
simply because a project benefi ts one or more private parties does not 
imply that the taking itself is based on impermissible favoritism.152 
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153 See 16 USC § 1540(d).
154 See 16 USC § 3375(d).
155 See, for example, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc v United States, 
530 US 604, 610 (2000) (discussing steps necessary for private corporation to obtain 
“an exploratory well drilling permit”).
Thus, “Category 1” takings, in which a public development is based 
on public information, involve some risk of pretext but that risk is 
minimal.
2. Private Information—Public Development
Similarly, if an assembly project is based on private information and 
executed by a public development, the risk of pretext is minimal. 
Although this category of takings does entail private involvement in 
the initial stage of identifying the assembly site, there is no private 
involvement in the subsequent stage of developing the site. The gov-
ernment ultimately retains ownership and control of the property. 
For “Category 2” takings, there is thus little risk that the assembly 
is pretextual.
In practice, this category of takings is relatively uncommon. Devel-
opers have virtually no incentive to share information with local 
offi cials if they do not expect to receive a benefi t from the resulting 
assembly. If developers sometimes do have better information than 
offi cials about the location of public projects, it might be desirable 
to design a mechanism that encourages these developers to disclose 
this information.
One possible mechanism by which a local government might ob-
tain information regarding potential assembly sites is by compen-
sating developers through rewards or contracts. The federal govern-
ment relies on similar mechanisms in other situations in which 
useful information is dispersed among private individuals. For ex-
ample, Congress offers rewards for information regarding violations 
of, among other laws, the Endangered Species Act153 and the Lacey 
Act.154 Likewise, the Department of Interior relies on contracts with 
private oil companies for exploratory drilling in public oil fi elds.155
In the takings context, however, the administrative costs of imple-
menting a reward system or the transaction costs of entering explor-
atory contracts might be relatively high. These costs would include 
the costs of calculating the expected social value of the private sec-
tor’s information regarding public projects. Ultimately, such costs 
might outweigh the opportunity costs of the local government’s 
not being able to rely on this type of information for its projects. 
Nevertheless, in certain situations, if the government wants to rely 
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156 George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF- Driven Economic Devel-
opment: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School 
Districts, 83 Tul L Rev 45, 80-81 (2008) (citing Patience A. Crowder, “Ain’t No Sun-
shine”: Examining Informality and State Open Meetings Acts as the Anti- Public 
Norm in Inner- City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 Tenn L Rev 623 (2007) and 
Charles L. Siemon, Public/ Private Partnerships and Fundamental Fairness in City 
on private parties for information but is concerned about the pos-
sibility of pretext, a scheme that severs private involvement in the 
identifi cation stage from private involvement in the development 
stage could be useful.
Overall, whenever the local government itself develops a con-
demned parcel, regardless of whether the government relies on public 
or private information, pretext is generally not a concern. As dis-
cussed below, the risk that a taking’s asserted purpose is pretextual 
increases signifi cantly when a project involves a private developer.
3. Public Information—Private Development
If an assembly project is based on public information but executed 
by a private developer, there is an elevated risk that the taking is 
pretextual. In this situation, private involvement is unnecessary for 
identifying the optimal assembly site because the determination 
of the optimal site is based on the government’s own information. 
However, private involvement may be necessary for developing the 
site because a private party, rather than the government, is better 
able to execute the development.
Knowing that a project will require private involvement, private 
parties may attempt to persuade the government to designate them 
as the developer before a site has been identifi ed. As George Lefcoe 
points out, this type of pre- condemnation private involvement is 
routine:
Politically connected developers confer informally with public 
offi cials about the possibility of their striking a redevelopment 
deal long before the formal redevelopment process begins. An 
experienced Florida- based land use attorney, Charles Siemon, 
observes that developers and local offi cials often reach tenta-
tive agreements before the beginning of the public review pro-
cess. The negotiated deal is presented and approved at a public 
meeting pretty much as presented. State open meeting laws 
require elected offi cials to conduct their business in sessions 
that are open to the public but these laws don’t bar discussions 
between developers and individual offi cials and most of them 
allow offi cials to conduct secret discussions of real estate trans-
actions.156
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Deal Making, in Terry Jill Lassar, Introduction to City Deal Making 81 (Urban Land 
Institute 1990)). For a contrasting view, see Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 55 (cited in note 
24) (“Most developer- selection processes reveal that, while the resulting relationship 
is important to both parties, it is not collusive.”).
157 See Part II(A).
158 See id.
159 See Part IV(A)(1).
160 The term “preferred developer” also encompasses a “master developer” that 
the local government may select. See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 54 (cited in note 
24) (noting that “the city may advertise for a ‘master developer’ ” who may “assist 
the city with planning, perform due diligence reviews concerning site issues such as 
contamination, and assist in estimating the cost of old infrastructure demolition and 
new project- related infrastructure and improvements”).
161 Perry Shapiro and Jonathan Pincus, Effi ciency and Equity in the Assemblage of 
Land for Public Use: The L2H2 Auction *4 (2007), online at http:// www .economics
.adelaide .edu.au/ workshops/ workshops/2008papers/ 080407pincus .pdf (visited May 
19, 2008).
This type of pre- condemnation private involvement increases the 
possibility of corruption, secondary rent seeking, and relocation 
threats—each of which can lead to socially undesirable outcomes.157 
Moreover, even when developers are not selected before the site has 
been identifi ed, these problems may still exist because, after the gov-
ernment selects the site, developers may compete for the designation 
of “preferred developer.”158 Thus, unlimited private involvement, 
either before or after the taking, increases the risk of a pretextual 
taking.
However, in situations in which the government does not need 
to rely on private information to identify the assembly site, pre-
 condemnation private involvement is generally unnecessary. As 
discussed above, the justifi cation for private involvement before 
the taking is that a private party may have better information than 
the government regarding the optimal site.159 But here, because the 
government itself has information regarding the site, such private 
involvement is unnecessary. Moreover, although the government 
may wish to rely on a private party to execute the development, it 
is unnecessary for the government to select a preferred developer.160 
Instead, the government can select a developer after the condemna-
tions through a competitive process such as an auction.
Indeed, several commentators have pointed out the potential ad-
vantages of relying on mechanisms like auctions to reduce the risk 
of favoritism in assembly projects. For example, Perry Shapiro and 
Jonathan Pincus observe that “redevelopment partnerships may be 
legitimate ways to reduce transaction costs and share development 
risks, but they smack of cozy dealing between city hall and special 
private interests.”161 Shapiro and Pincus thus propose an “open auc-
tion process” and point out that one of the attractive aspects of such 
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162 Id at *15; cf. Petition for Certiorari, Goldstein v Pataki, Civil Action No 07-1247, 
*6 (US fi led Mar 31, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 899311) (pointing out that 
“the selection of private developers for projects that receive billions of dollars in tax 
breaks and direct subsidies are typically subject to competitive selection”).
163 545 US at 492 (Kennedy concurring).
a process is that it “erases the suspicion of backroom cozy dealing 
between politicians and private interests.”162
Justice Kennedy himself might be sympathetic to such an approach. 
In his concurring opinion in Kelo, Kennedy emphasized that benefi t-
ing Pfi zer did not appear to be the primary motivation of the project 
because the government had “reviewed a variety of development 
plans and chose a private developer from a group of applicants rather 
than picking out a particular transferee beforehand.”163 An auction 
process encourages “a group of applicants” as well. But an auction 
has the additional benefi t of removing governmental discretion in 
selecting among the applicants.
This approach addresses all three of the problems created by 
unlimited private involvement. First, limiting pre- condemnation 
private involvement and post- condemnation involvement by a pre-
ferred private party reduces the possibility of corruption. Backroom 
deals between local offi cials and private parties, as well as the percep-
tion of inordinate private infl uence in the eminent domain process, 
are eliminated. Second, private parties have little incentive, either 
before or after the condemnation, to lobby local offi cials to become 
the preferred developer. Selecting a developer through a competitive 
process thus reduces secondary rent seeking. Third, private parties 
do not have any incentive to threaten to relocate. A party threatening 
relocation unless the local government condemns land on its behalf 
would have no way to ensure that it would be the new owner of the 
assembled property.
This approach also does not create the problems inherent in the 
existing test based on Kelo or an alternative test based on intent. 
Prohibiting pre- condemnation private involvement in situations in 
which the local government has information regarding the assembly 
site does not eliminate a public benefi t. Because this approach only 
prohibits private involvement where such involvement does not 
entail a public benefi t, disutility is not a problem. Moreover, if a 
court invalidated a taking based on impermissible favoritism, local 
offi cials still would be required to limit private involvement in any 
future attempt to condemn the land. Because it would be diffi cult for 
the government to circumvent this rule, futility is also not a prob-
lem. Finally, the local government does have information regarding 
certain types of takings including takings in which the reason for the 
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164 See, for example, Part V(B)(1) (discussing the observable characteristics of blight); 
Part V(B)(2) (discussing redevelopment districts that already exist).
165 See Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 54 (cited in note 24) (“Cities typically lack access 
to capital early in the project, [sic] cannot front high ‘predevelopment’ expenses (that is 
the costs of planners, economists, engineers, and attorneys necessary to work through 
the details of the project proposal).”). Commentators also have suggested that early 
involvement by private parties may be useful for identifying the developer and the 
ultimate owners and thereby for ensuring that there is suffi cient interest in the project. 
See Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 841 (cited in note 71) (observing that “entrepre-
neurial redevelopment directors began reaching out to private developers early in the 
planning stages” because “local governments came to appreciate the virtues of rede-
velopment agencies striking a deal with a developer or receiving suffi cient expressions 
of interest and preliminary negotiations to attain confi dence that the project would 
be completed on schedule”); Mihaly, 34 Ecology L Q at 58 (cited in note 24) (asserting 
that “very early in the project, even during the extensive negotiation period before a 
contractual relationship is cemented, the putative master developer, or the master 
developer and the city together, may work to identify such a potential owner who can 
generate revenue early in the development”). However, this potential justifi cation for 
pre- condemnation private involvement seems somewhat tenuous because it is pos-
sible to gauge the market’s interest in purchasing an asset without engaging in a sale or 
a promise to sell. Cf. Sean J. Griffi th, Spinning and Underpricing: Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 Brook 
L Rev 583, 613 (2004) (describing how underwriters “buil[d] a book of tentative orders 
refl ecting each investor’s interest in a number of shares at a particular price from 
which the lead underwriter will be able to gauge the level of demand for the issue and 
thereby arrive at a more accurate offering price that may be set within or outside of the 
estimated range”). Likewise, it would seem that a local government is capable of gaug-
ing the potential private interest in a project without committing to a particular devel-
oper. Moreover, some local governments select assembly sites without any private 
involvement. For example, a number of cities, including Baltimore, Maryland, have 
relied on Requests for Proposals (or “RFPs”), in which the condemnor takes property 
without having any plan for its development and then requests proposals from private 
developers. See Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at 107-08 (cited in note 156) (discussing Mayor & 
City Council of Baltimore City v Valsamaki, 916 A2d 324 (Md 2007)).
assembly is observable or the site is known.164 Because these types 
of takings can be identifi ed in advance, administrability is also not 
a problem.
Admittedly, an approach that prohibits all pre- condemnation pri-
vate involvement, as well as all post- condemnation involvement by 
a particular private developer, may be overinclusive. That is, even 
when a local government has information regarding the optimal as-
sembly site, there may be certain circumstances in which private 
involvement is necessary, despite the risk of impermissible favor-
itism. For example, if a city lacks access to funding for the early 
stages of a project, the city may need to rely on a private developer 
to provide the necessary capital.165 The possibility of overinclusive-
ness suggests that, instead of a per se rule against pre- condemnation 
private involvement or post- condemnation private involvement by 
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166 See Part V(A) (proposing burden- shifting framework in which the government 
has the opportunity to proffer a non- pretextual reason for such private involvement); 
cf. Kelo, 545 US at 493 (Kennedy concurring) (suggesting the possibility that a pre-
sumption of invalidity may be “rebuttable”).
167 See Shapiro and Pincus, Effi ciency and Equity in the Assemblage of Land for 
Public Use at *12-13 (cited in note 161).
168 See Part IV(A)(1).
a preferred developer, a local government should be able to rely on a 
private developer in certain situations if it can provide a justifi cation 
for such involvement.166
As a general matter, however, the risk of impermissible favoritism 
for this category of takings does not justify the potential benefi ts of 
private involvement. Both pre- condemnation private involvement 
and post- condemnation private involvement by a preferred developer 
often raise the likelihood of a pretextual transfer without any cor-
responding benefi t. Thus, “Category 3” takings, in which a private 
development is based on public information, entail an elevated risk 
of pretext; yet, it may be unnecessary for society to bear this risk.
4. Private Information—Private Development
There is also an elevated risk that a taking is pretextual if an as-
sembly project is based on private information and executed by a 
private developer. In this situation, private parties might be involved 
before a condemnation occurs because private information may be 
necessary for determining the optimal assembly site. Private parties 
also might be involved after the condemnation occurs either because 
the private party would otherwise be unwilling to provide informa-
tion for determining the site or because the private party is better 
able to develop the site.
Prohibiting pre- condemnation private involvement and post-
 condemnation involvement by a preferred developer might be an 
effective approach for eliminating pretext in this category of takings 
as well. That is, if the benefi ts of targeting pretext outweigh the oppor-
tunity costs of foregoing private participation, it might be desirable 
to limit private involvement in both “Category 3” and “Category 4” 
takings. Indeed, scholars who advocate the use of an auction system 
appear to suggest that this type of system would be useful whenever 
a private party is involved in the development.167
However, for takings that require private information to identify 
the optimal site, there are two potential problems with this approach. 
First, a local government sometimes may need to rely on private 
involvement before the taking.168 Specifi cally, because the govern-
ment does not have information regarding the optimal assembly 
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site, the government may have to rely on a developer to provide 
this information.169 A developer also may have more of an incen-
tive than the government to acquire this information. Eliminating 
pre- condemnation private involvement might therefore eliminate 
a potential advantage of private involvement. Second, the govern-
ment sometimes may need to rely on a particular private party as the 
preferred developer. Without being assured of the potential benefi ts 
that accrue to the preferred developer after the taking, a developer 
might have little incentive to provide benefi cial information before 
the taking.
Suppose that a private developer is aware of a promising oppor-
tunity for a new commercial development. The potential site of the 
development, however, is excessively fragmented among dozens of 
landowners. The local government may not have information regard-
ing this opportunity or the requirements of a commercial develop-
ment. If the government had to rely on its own information, the 
development may never be built or, if it is built, it may be constructed 
in a suboptimal location. By contrast, if pre- condemnation private 
involvement is permitted, local offi cials might be able to capitalize 
on the developer’s information in order to identify the optimal loca-
tion and then rely on the developer’s expertise in order to execute the 
development.170
As discussed above, the government could sever the private 
involvement in the identifi cation of the site from the private involve-
ment in the development of the site.171 For example, the government 
could hire a private developer solely to provide information about 
the optimal location of a possible assembly site. It could then rely 
on a different developer to execute the project once the site has been 
assembled. However, as noted above, the administrative costs of 
implementing a reward system or the transaction costs of entering 
exploratory contracts might be relatively high.172 In any event, while 
the government could choose to rely on two private parties—one 
before the condemnation and one after the condemnation—such a 
strategy is clearly not constitutionally required.
Admittedly, by allowing pre- condemnation private involvement 
and post- condemnation involvement by a preferred developer in 
these types of takings, this approach to targeting pretext is poten-
tially underinclusive. In certain circumstances, a local government 
might claim that private information is necessary for an assembly 
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173 See notes 52 & 71 and accompanying text. But cf. Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 63 
(cited in note 23) (advancing theory of public use requirement that avoids “relying 
on the imperfect information of either legislatures or courts”). However, even if this 
approach is underinclusive for “Category 4” takings, it is still likely to be superior 
to either relying on the timing of the identifi cation of private parties, a test that is 
both underinclusive and overinclusive, see Part III(A)(3), or the condemnor’s intent, 
a test that is both underinclusive and entails the problems of disutility, futility, and 
administrability, see Part III(B).
even though the private involvement is pretextual. Likewise, the 
government might assert that it is necessary to designate a particu-
lar party as the preferred developer even though the developer could 
have been selected through a competitive process such as an auction. 
Being underinclusive in situations in which local governments do 
not have adequate information may be necessary, however, because 
otherwise judges would be charged with comparing the potential 
costs and benefi ts of private involvement, a task that they have been 
reluctant to perform.173 Thus, although “Category 4” takings entail 
an elevated risk of pretext, it sometimes may be necessary for society 
to bear this risk.
Overall, as Figure 2 indicates, the risk of a pretextual taking var-
ies depending on whether a taking is a public or private develop-
ment. When the taking involves a public development (Category 1 or 
Category 2), the risk of favoritism is minimal. By contrast, when the 
taking entails a private development (Category 3 or Category 4), the 
risk of favoritism is elevated. Importantly, however, whether there 
is a possible justifi cation for this elevated level of risk depends on 
whether private information is necessary for identifying the develop-
ment site. When private information is unnecessary for identifying 
the site (Category 3), there is generally no justifi cation for either pre-
 condemnation private involvement or post- condemnation involve-
ment by a preferred developer. By contrast, when private information 

















(possible justifi cation for pre-
condemnation involvement)
Figure 2. Risk of Pretext in Four Categories of Takings
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174 411 US 792 (1973).
175 See id at 802-05.
176 See Swierkiewicz v Sorema N. A., 534 US 506, 511 (2002) (“[I]f a plaintiff is able 
to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail without proving all the 
elements of a prima facie case.”).
177 See Trans World Airlines, Inc v Thurston, 469 US 111, 121 (1985) (noting that 
“the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evi-
dence of discrimination”).
178 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802 (setting forth requirements of a prima 
facie case); see also Desert Palace, Inc v Costa, 539 US 90 (2003) (holding that direct 
evidence of discrimination is not required to prove employment discrimination in 
mixed- motive cases under Title VII).
179 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802-05.
180 476 US 79 (1986).
181 See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 
50 Stan L Rev 9, 23-24 (1997) (pointing out that “Batson’s procedural framework for 
assessing whether a peremptory strike violates the equal protection principle, and 
is necessary for identifying the site (Category 4), a possible justifi ca-
tion exists for certain types of private involvement.
V.  A  F R A M E W O R K  B A S E D  O N  T I T L E  V I I
A. Takings and Title VII
Identifying pretextual motivation is a concern in many areas of the 
law besides eminent domain. One area in which pretext plays a 
particularly prominent role is in employment discrimination cases 
under Title VII. In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,174 the 
Supreme Court created a tripartite burden- shifting framework for 
analyzing claims of discriminatory treatment.175 An employee may 
prevail on a Title VII claim if she is able to produce direct evidence 
of discrimination.176 If so, the McDonnell Douglas burden- shifting 
framework does not apply.177 However, an employee also may prevail 
on a Title VII claim by producing indirect evidence of discrimination 
and satisfying the burden- shifting test.178 Under this test, even if an 
employer is able to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for its employment action, the employee can still prove disparate 
treatment by offering evidence that the employer’s explanation is 
pretextual.179
Since McDonnell Douglas, this burden- shifting framework has 
been extended from Title VII cases to several other contexts involv-
ing a concern about pretext. For example, in Batson v. Kentucky,180 
the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the Title VII framework for 
analyzing challenges to preemptory strikes.181 Likewise, several fed-
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indeed the very term ‘pretext,’ are borrowed from Supreme Court opinions in employ-
ment discrimination cases arising under that civil rights law” (citing Batson, 476 US 
at 94 n 18, 96 n 19, 98 n 21)); see also Deana Kim El- Mallawany, Comment, Johnson 
v California and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims, 74 Fordham L Rev 3333, 
3346 n 83 (2006) (“Since adopting the three- part framework in Batson, the Court has 
regularly relied on Title VII cases to shed light on the burden- shifting process.” (col-
lecting cases)).
182 See Raytheon Co v Hernandez, 540 US 44, 49 n 3 (2003) (noting that “Courts 
of Appeals have consistently utilized this burden- shifting approach when reviewing 
motions for summary judgment in disparate- treatment cases” (citing Pugh v Attica, 
259 F3d 619, 626 (7th Cir 2001) (applying burden- shifting approach to a disparate-
 treatment claim under the American with Disabilities Act))).
183 See, for example, Brine v Univ of Iowa, 90 F3d 271, 276 (8th Cir 1996) (conclud-
ing that the Title VII standards should apply to claims arising under Title IX); Lipsett 
v Univ of Puerto Rico, 864 F2d 881, 897 (1st Cir 1988) (same); see also Catherine 
Pieronek, Title IX Beyond Thirty: A Review of Recent Developments, 30 JC & UL 
75, 117 (2003) (“Both Title VII and Title IX employ the burden- shifting framework 
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green.”).
184 Most federal takings claims will arise in state court (as in Kelo) because of 
the procedural requirements that apply to takings claims after Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172 (1985), 
and San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco, 545 US 323 (2005). See Wil-
liam A. Fletcher, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel: Takings Law Now Belongs to the 
States, 46 Santa Clara L Rev 767, 777-78 (2006).
185 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802.
eral courts of appeals have adopted the Title VII framework in ana-
lyzing discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.182 A number of circuits also have relied on the test in evaluating 
gender discrimination claims under Title IX.183
In this section, I suggest that Title VII’s burden- shifting framework 
can and should be adopted in the takings context to provide a practi-
cable mechanism for identifying when private involvement becomes 
pretextual. For takings claims arising under state law, the proposed 
framework could be enacted by state legislatures or adopted by state 
courts. For takings claims arising under federal law, the framework 
could be implemented by Congress or adopted by federal courts.184 
Whether under state or federal law, the burden- shifting test would 
involve three steps: the condemnee’s prima facie case, the condem-
nor’s burden to rebut the prima facie case by offering a legitimate jus-
tifi cation for private involvement, and the condemnee’s opportunity 
to prove that the condemnor’s justifi cation is pretextual.
1. Condemnee’s Prima Facie Case
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must fi rst 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.185 In the takings con-
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186 See Hoffman v Caterpillar, Inc, 256 F3d 568, 576 (7th Cir 2001) (“Direct evidence 
cases, like this one, are very rare in the employment discrimination context because 
employers are generally very careful to avoid statements that suggest discriminatory 
intent—whether their true intentions are discriminatory or not.”); see also Price 
Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor concurring) (“[T]he entire 
purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that 
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.”).
187 Cf. Franco v Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp, 930 A2d 160, 169 (DC 2007) 
(pointing out that “government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbid-
den reason”).
188 See notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
189 See Part IV (B)(1).
190 See Part IV (B)(2)- (4).
text, the primary concern is favoritism. Thus, in the fi rst step, a con-
demnee would be required to demonstrate that a taking involves the 
possibility of favoritism, a showing that could be made in one of 
two ways.
First, the condemnee could provide direct evidence of favoritism. 
Direct evidence of favoritism might include a “smoking gun” such 
as an email exchange between a local offi cial and a private developer 
that indicates that the actual purpose of the taking is to benefi t the 
developer. As in the Title VII context, in which it is often diffi cult for 
plaintiffs to provide direct evidence of discrimination,186 it is rather 
unlikely that a condemnee would be able to produce direct evidence 
of favoritism.187 However, if the condemnee is able to produce such 
evidence, the condemnee would be entitled to prevail without prov-
ing the other elements of a prima facie case.188
Second, the condemnee could establish a prima facie case of favor-
itism through indirect evidence. To establish a prima facie case, the 
condemnee would be required to prove two elements. First, the con-
demnee would be required to demonstrate that the project involves a 
private party. The involvement of a private party is a logical element 
of the prima facie case because the risk of pretext is minimal without 
private involvement.189 Second, the condemnee would be required 
to show that, as a result of the assembly, the private party might 
obtain a distinct benefi t. A possible benefi t to the private party is 
also a logical element of the prima facie case because favoritism is 
only possible in a project in which a private party expects to obtain 
an advantage.190
Clearly, a condemnee would not be able to establish a prima facie 
case for every taking. For example, if a local government attempts to 
take land for a public school, a condemnee’s claim that the taking is 
pretextual would fail at step one. Here, no private party is involved. 
Likewise, if a development corporation, which is typically a private 
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191 See, for example, Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 473 (2005) (noting that 
“respondent New London Development Corporation” is “a private nonprofi t entity”).
192 Id.
193 Cf. St Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502, 506 (1993) (characterizing the 
requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas as “mini-
mal”); Zamora v Elite Logistics, Inc, 478 F3d 1160, 1171 (10th Cir 2007) (noting that 
the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII is “so 
light that only the most baseless of claims fails to satisfy it”).
194 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 US at 802-03.
nonprofi t entity,191 attempts to condemn land for a public develop-
ment, a condemnee’s claim that the taking is pretextual would fail 
at step one as well. Here, although the project does involve a private 
party (the development corporation), the development corporation 
is a nonprofi t entity and does not expect to obtain a distinct benefi t 
from the taking.192
By contrast, if a local government or development corporation 
planned to condemn several parcels and then transfer these parcels 
to a private developer, a condemnee might be able to establish a 
prima facie case. Such a project involves a private party (the devel-
oper), and the developer anticipates obtaining a distinct benefi t (the 
expected profi ts from the development). As in the Title VII context, 
the burden on the condemnee to establish a prima facie case would 
be relatively light.193 Indeed, private parties in both “Category 3” and 
“Category 4” takings are normally willing to assist the government 
only because they anticipate obtaining some type of benefi t. Thus, 
private involvement in the development of a site would usually re-
sult in a condemnee’s being able to satisfy step one.
2. Condemnor’s Burden
Under McDonnell Douglas, if an employee is able to satisfy step one, 
the burden shifts to the employer. Step two requires the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment 
action.194 By analogy, in the takings context, if the condemnee is able 
to satisfy step one, the burden would shift to the condemnor. Step 
two would require the condemnor to articulate a legitimate justifi ca-
tion for private involvement in the taking.
Importantly, if the condemnor simply asserted one or more of the 
traditional public purposes, such as eliminating urban blight, pre-
serving open space, generating new jobs, retaining existing jobs, or 
bolstering the tax base, that assertion by itself would not be suffi -
cient to satisfy step two. While many courts have held that these 
justifi cations satisfy the public use requirement, such justifi cations 
do not indicate whether, and to what extent, private involvement is 
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necessary for an assembly. For example, while an assembly based on 
blight may involve a private party that executes the development, 
the existence of blight by itself does not determine whether pre-
 condemnation private involvement or post- condemnation involve-
ment by a preferred developer is warranted.195 Thus, in attempting to 
justify private involvement, the condemnor could not rely solely on 
one or more of the general justifi cations for eminent domain.
Rather, the condemnor would be required to provide a specifi c 
justifi cation for why a particular type of private involvement is nec-
essary for the project at issue. For example, if a local government 
is able to show that a particular private party is necessary because 
of the information that party possesses and that pre- condemnation 
private involvement is not possible without designating the party 
as the post- condemnation developer, then the government might be 
able to satisfy its burden. Similarly, if the government is able to show 
that post- condemnation private involvement by a specifi c developer 
is necessary because that developer is the only fi rm technically ca-
pable of developing a particular site, then the condemnor also might 
be able to satisfy its burden. In each case, however, the government 
would be required to provide a specifi c justifi cation for why pre-
 condemnation private involvement or post- condemnation involve-
ment by a particular developer is necessary for that project.
3. Proving Pretext
Under McDonnell Douglas, if the employer meets its burden in 
step two, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears. 
However, in step three, the employee can still prove disparate treat-
ment by demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is pretex-
tual.196 Similarly, in the takings context, if the condemnor is able 
to meet its burden in step two, then the burden would shift back to 
the condemnee. To prevail in step three, the condemnee would be 
required to demonstrate that the condemnor’s proffered justifi cation 
for private involvement is pretextual.
The primary way in which a condemnee could demonstrate pre-
text at step three is to show that pre- condemnation private involve-
ment or post- condemnation involvement by a preferred private party 
is actually unnecessary. For example, the condemnee could establish 
that a taking was pretextual by showing that the private developer 
involved in the project could have been, but was not, selected after the 
condemnation through a competitive process such as an auction.
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198 See id.
199 See Part IV(A)(2); see also Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at 67 (cited in note 156) (“Develop-
ers often initiate economic development projects, and reach tentative understandings 
with redevelopment agencies before the agency hires the consulting fi rm that will 
fi nd whatever blight the law requires.”); Ellickson and Been, Land Use Controls at 
861 (cited in note 23) (“In most renewal projects, . . . the agency itself did not act as a 
developer. Instead, it typically would sell a cleared parcel to a private fi rm, subject to 
covenants designed to achieve plan objectives.”).
200 See Part IV (B)(3)- (4).
201 See, for example, Franco, 930 A2d at 169.
202 Most courts have concluded that eliminating blight is a “public purpose” and 
that previously blighted land can be transferred to one or more private parties. The 
As discussed above, when a local government is capable of select-
ing a private party through a competitive process but decides not to 
do so the taking should be considered pretextual.197 By not relying on 
such a process, the government creates an elevated risk of impermis-
sible favoritism. This elevated risk of favoritism is also not offset 
by the possibility of any countervailing public benefi ts. If the con-
demnee is able to establish that the condemnor’s asserted purpose for 
private involvement cannot be justifi ed, then the court should rule 
that the condemnee has satisfi ed step three and declare the taking to 
be pretextual.
On the other hand, if a local government does rely on a competi-
tive process, then there is little or no risk of impermissible favorit-
ism.198 In these circumstances, a private party is not involved in the 
project before the condemnation, and a particular private party is not 
selected by the government after the condemnation. Selection of a 
private developer through a neutral process ensures that the condem-
nation does not entail impermissible favoritism. The court should 
rule, therefore, that the private involvement is not pretextual.
B. Applications
1. Blighted Areas
When a local government condemns property because it is blighted, 
the government typically elects to redevelop the land rather than 
leaving it vacant. The government often engages in this type of 
redevelopment by transferring or leasing the land to a private devel-
oper.199 Yet, this type of private involvement can increase the risk 
that a taking is pretextual.200 Indeed, many courts have been hesitant 
to approve blight designations in cases in which the circumstances 
indicate that the taking may be pretextual.201 Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment may have an interest in relying on a private party to develop 
a site after the blight has been eliminated.202
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Michigan Supreme Court, in overruling Poletown, carved out an exception for blight 
condemnations. See County of Wayne v Hathcock, 684 NW2d 765, 782-83 (Mich 
2004). Likewise, the dissenters in Kelo distinguished blight condemnations from eco-
nomic development takings on the basis that targeting blight involves eliminating 
an affi rmative harm. See Kelo, 545 US at 500 (O’Connor dissenting). For an argument 
that eminent domain is an undesirable mechanism for revitalizing blighted neighbor-
hoods, see Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify Condemnation?, 39 Urb Law 
833, 833 (2007) (contending that, although “blackletter law provides that the presence 
of blight justifi es condemnation, . . . ‘blight condemnation’ is dubious at best, both in 
theory and practice”); cf. Kelo, 545 US at 520 (Thomas dissenting) (asserting that “if 
the slums at issue [in Berman] were truly ‘blighted,’ then state nuisance law, not the 
power of eminent domain, would provide the appropriate remedy.” (citations omit-
ted)).
203 See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 265-66 (cited in note 4) (“Early blight cases in 
the 1940s and 1950s upheld condemnations in areas that closely fi t the layperson’s 
intuitive notion of ‘blight’: dilapidated, dangerous, disease- ridden neighborhoods. . . . 
In the years since those early cases, many states have expanded the concept of blight 
to encompass almost any area where economic development could potentially be 
increased.”). After Kelo, several states have tightened their statutory defi nitions of 
blight. See Eagle, 39 Urb Law at 835 (cited in note 202) (discussing “recent statutory 
limitations on blight”).
204 For an overview of post- Kelo defi nitions of blight, see generally Somin, 93 Minn 
L Rev at 2120-31 (cited in note 23); for an earlier survey, see Hudson Hayes Luce, The 
Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 Real Property, Probate & 
Trust J 389 (2000).
205 348 US 26, 30 (1954).
206 Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protec-
tion, 107 Colum L Rev 883, 910 n 118 (2007) (citing 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain 
(CBS television broadcast Sept 28, 2003)).
207 Morriss, 17 S Ct Econ Rev at 237 (cited in note 8) (quoting Patricia E. Salkin and 
Lora A. Lucero, Community Redevelopment, Public Use, and Eminent Domain, 37 
Urb Law 201, 219 (2005) (citing 60 Minutes: Eminent Domain (CBS television broad-
cast Sept 28, 2003)).
In addition to deciding whether or not to rely on a private party to 
develop a previously blighted area, the government also must make 
the initial determination of whether an area is actually blighted. Fac-
tors for determining blight have varied across time203 and continue to 
vary across jurisdictions.204 Yet a common feature of blight is that it 
is usually observable. For example, in Berman v. Parker, the National 
Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) declared an area in Southwest 
Washington, D.C. blighted because, among other things, “57.8% of 
the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked 
electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, [and] 83.8% 
lacked central heating.”205 Modern characteristics of blight include 
everything from lack of a “two- car attached garage”206 to a yard that 
failed to meet “minimum size requirements,”207 but these types of 
characteristics are observable as well.
Because blight factors are usually observable, the local govern-
ment itself is generally able to identify blighted areas without rely-
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208 See Shapiro and Pincus, Effi ciency and Equity in the Assemblage of Land for 
Public Use at *15 (cited in note 161).
209 Berman, 348 US at 26.
210 See Part V(A). For an overview of redevelopment efforts in Washington, DC in 
the 1950s, see generally Howard Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty: Race, Plan-
ning, and the Failure of Urban Policy in Washington, DC 155-65 (Johns Hopkins U 
1995).
211 See Berman, 348 US at 31 (noting Berman’s objection that his property “will be 
put into the project under the management of a private, not a public, agency and rede-
veloped for private, not public, use”); id at 33 (noting that “one of the means chosen is 
the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area”).
212 See text accompanying note 189.
213 See Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty at 155 (cited in note 210) (describing 
the “enthusiasm of local developers for slum clearance”).
214 See text accompanying note 190.
215 See text accompanying note 205.
216 Gillette, Jr., Between Justice and Beauty at 163 (cited in note 210).
ing on private developers. Consequently, pre- condemnation private 
involvement is typically unnecessary. Moreover, although the local 
government may wish to rely on a private party to develop a previ-
ously blighted area, the government normally does not need to rely 
on a preferred private developer. Instead, the government is capable 
of using an auction or other mechanism to select a developer without 
creating a risk of impermissible favoritism.208
As a result, an assembly project involving blight condemnations, 
such as the takings at issue in Berman,209 could be analyzed under 
the burden- shifting framework discussed above.210 Indeed, the con-
demnee in Berman, an owner of a non- blighted department store in 
Washington, D.C., may have been able to establish a prima facie case 
of favoritism. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency 
(the “Agency”) intended to transfer the assembly site to private devel-
opers,211 satisfying the fi rst element of a prima facie case,212 and those 
developers would have expected to obtain a benefi t from redevelop-
ing the site,213 satisfying the second element of a prima facie case.214
If Berman did satisfy step one, the burden would have shifted to 
the Agency as condemnor. The Agency would have been required 
to provide a legitimate reason for the particular type of private in-
volvement that was expected to occur. A simple assertion by the 
Agency that many of the properties within the development area 
were “blighted” would not have been suffi cient. If the Agency had 
argued that it was necessary to rely on private developers before the 
taking, the Agency may have had a diffi cult time justifying its posi-
tion. The existence of blight in Southwest Washington, D.C. was so 
apparent that the Agency did not need to rely on private information 
to identify the site.215 Moreover, because “[n]inety- nine percent of 
the buildings in the Southwest were torn down,”216 it does not appear 
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217 Cf. id at 156 (discussing a number of plans and noting that “the most infl uential 
plan proposed for the Southwest was one envisioning wholesale redevelopment”).
218 See Schneider v District of Columbia, 117 F Supp 705, 708 (DDC 1953) (three-
 judge court), aff’d sub nom, Berman v Parker, 348 US 26 (1954) (noting that the 
“Agency advertised for proposals to negotiate for the purchase or lease of land in the 
project area” and “[a]fter due consideration the Agency accepted the proposals of fi ve 
bidders who owned property in the area . . . , each to repurchase its present property, 
and of the Bush Construction Company for the remainder of the area”).
219 The urban renewal project at issue in Berman actually evolved from a plan with 
“the more modest goal of improving the area for its existing residents,” Gillette, Jr., 
Between Justice and Beauty at 272 n 55 (cited in note 210) (citing report of the com-
munity meeting on Southwest in the Washington Star, Nov. 21, 1952), to an initiative 
that “encouraged planners to shift to ‘the maximum- optimum’ development proposal 
offered by the New York real estate developer William Zeckendorf,” id (quoting cor-
respondence from John Searles to James Goode, July 15, 1983).
220 See, for example, Berman, 348 US at 34; Franco, 930 A2d at 171; see also Lefcoe, 
17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 825 (cited in note 71) (explaining that “[c]ourts usually 
approve takings of unblighted properties located within blighted areas if local offi cials 
believe the taking to be necessary for achieving the redevelopment plan” and citing 
Berman as an example).
221 348 US at 34.
that the parcels at issue required the specifi c expertise of particular 
developers after the taking.217 In order to carry its burden at step two, 
the Agency most likely would have had to establish that any private 
involvement would occur only after the condemnation of the site and 
that such private involvement would not entail the use of preferred 
developers.
Assuming the Agency was able to provide a legitimate reason for 
post- condemnation private involvement, the burden would have 
then shifted back to Berman. Berman would have had the oppor-
tunity to offer evidence that the expected involvement of private 
developers was pretextual. For example, Berman may have been able 
to argue that the Agency was able, but failed, to select private devel-
opers through a competitive process. Based on the district court’s 
recitation of the facts, it is not clear whether the Agency’s bidding 
process for the site was, in fact, entirely competitive.218 If the Agency 
failed to rely on a competitive process, the selection of developers 
might have entailed an elevated risk of pretext and Berman may have 
prevailed at step three.219
It is also possible, as in Berman, that the government might 
attempt to designate an entire area as “blighted” even though the area 
includes both blighted and non- blighted parcels.220 In analyzing these 
cases, courts should identify whether or not the blighted and non-
 blighted properties are intermingled. Where the blighted and non-
 blighted properties are intermingled, as in Berman,221 the analysis of 
pretext should proceed as if the entire area was blighted. Accordingly, 
assuming that the jurisdiction permits condemnations on the basis 
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222 516 F3d 50, 53 (2d Cir 2008) (noting that, although approximately half of the 
project site lies within “a heavily blighted area,” the site also includes “an adjacent 
parcel of land with less blight . . . that is currently held by private parties”).
223 Cf. Gallenthin Realty Dev, Inc v Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A2d 447, 464 (NJ 
2007) (holding that, “although non- blighted parcels may be included in a redevelop-
ment plan if necessary for rehabilitation of a larger blighted area, the record contains 
no evidence suggesting that the Gallenthin property is integral to the larger BP/ Dow 
Redevelopment Area” (internal citation omitted)).
224 Since Kelo, a few states have explicitly prohibited the government from includ-
ing non- blighted properties in blighted areas. See Dana, 32 Vt L Rev at 168 n 72 (cited 
in note 28) (noting statutes in Minnesota and Wisconsin); Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at 
51-52 (cited in note 156) (describing amended North Carolina statute). Other states 
have signifi cantly restricted the taking of non- blighted properties in blighted areas. 
See, for example, Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 826-27 & n 132 (cited in note 71) 
(discussing West Virginia statute).
225 See Part V(B)(2).
226 See Part V(B)(3).
227 See, for example, City of Minneapolis v Wurtele, 291 NW2d 386, 388 (Minn 
1980) (“The Development District Law, Minn. Stat. ch. 472A (1978), was designed to 
allow municipalities to designate as ‘development districts’ areas which, while not yet 
‘blighted,’ show a trend toward decreasing economic utility and tax base.”).
of blight, private involvement in the taking should be analyzed under 
the burden- shifting framework described above. By contrast, where 
the blighted and non- blighted properties are not intermingled, as in 
Goldstein v. Pataki,222 the court should invoke a “severance” doc-
trine and analyze both areas separately.223 Accordingly, in the absence 
of any controlling statutory law,224 condemnation of the blighted por-
tion should be analyzed as a taking in a blighted area, and condemna-
tion of the non- blighted portion should be analyzed as a taking in a 
redevelopment district225 or a new assembly.226
2. Redevelopment Districts
The defi nition of a redevelopment district, like the defi nition of a 
blighted area, varies by jurisdiction. Certain states include blighted 
parcels in redevelopment districts, while other states explicitly dis-
tinguish between blight and redevelopment.227 Redevelopment dis-
tricts that do not include blight often target parcels that are “dete-
riorating.” Deterioration, like blight, is a determination based on 
the physical characteristics of existing structures, so it is typically 
observable as well.
Because deterioration is typically observable, the government 
usually does not need to rely on a private party for information 
regarding the assembly site. For takings in redevelopment districts, 
pre- condemnation private involvement is thus generally unneces-
sary. Although a local government may wish to utilize a private party 
This content downloaded from 129.74.89.102 on Mon, 14 Oct 2013 10:52:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Daniel B. Kelly 225
228 See notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
229 See Lefcoe, 83 Tul L Rev at 64-65 (cited in note 156) (pointing out that “[m]any 
redevelopment agencies have included already commenced projects into a newly 
formed redevelopment project area” and thus “stretch[ed] the boundaries of an exist-
ing project area to encompass a purely private development about to be built”).
for the post- condemnation development, the government does not 
need to select a preferred developer. Instead, the government could 
use an auction or other competitive mechanism to select a developer 
without creating a risk of impermissible favoritism.228
Moreover, in some cases, redevelopment districts already exist. 
For these districts, like districts in which deterioration is observ-
able, pre- condemnation private involvement is unnecessary. The 
local government already knows the boundaries of the assembly 
site. Similarly, if a condemnor attempts to expand an existing rede-
velopment district to justify additional development outside of the 
district’s boundaries,229 private involvement should also be limited. 
In these cases, the primary development site has already been identi-
fi ed so private developers normally will not have any advantage over 
the local government in identifying areas adjacent to the site that are 
suitable for redevelopment.
3. New Assemblies
New assemblies differ from condemnations in both blighted areas 
and redevelopment districts. For new assemblies, a private developer, 
rather than the local government, may have information regarding the 
desirability of a particular site. Before the condemnation, the govern-
ment may therefore need to rely on a developer for a non- pretextual 
purpose. After the condemnation, the government also may need to 
rely on a particular developer because a developer might be unwilling 
to provide information about the optimal site if the developer does 
not expect to obtain some benefi t from the assembly.
As an empirical matter, local governments may have information 
regarding the optimal site for certain new assemblies. After all, local 
offi cials have access to land records, and these records might indicate 
that an area is excessively fragmented. The burden- shifting frame-
work is thus potentially underinclusive: it allows pre- condemnation 
private involvement for new assemblies even though, for at least 
some of these projects, the government’s information might have 
been suffi cient to identify the site. Such a framework also means 
that, all other things being equal, condemnations involving non-
 blighted land would be subject to less scrutiny than condemnations 
involving blighted land. As a result, a developer may have an incen-
tive to propose a new assembly rather than developing a previously 
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230 Cf. Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 821 (cited in note 71) (noting that fi nd-
ings of “blight” are “occasionally challenged by homeowners fearing that an offi cial 
designation of blight will hurt property values” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).
231 Cf. David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor 
After Kelo, 101 Nw U L Rev 365, 378-82 (2007) (discussing the “legal privileging of 
blight condemnation (as compared to economic development condemnations)” and 
concluding that “[t]he effects of the legal differentiation . . . will not be merely expres-
sive but also, straightforwardly, economic: this differentiation may change the eco-
nomics of land development so as to produce more condemnations in poorer areas by 
making land assembly more expensive in middle- class neighborhoods relative to poor 
neighborhoods”).
232 See Garnett, 105 Mich L Rev at 137 (cited in note 31) (“Almost all post- Kelo 
reform proposals would extend property rule protection against eminent domain, 
either by prohibiting ‘economic development’ takings outright or by limiting the 
funds available for such takings.”).
233 See Somin, 93 Minn L Rev at 2120-31 (cited in note 23) (discussing broad blight 
exemptions).
blighted parcel even though, from a social perspective, development 
of the blighted parcel might be more desirable.
However, the framework also has two implications that may miti-
gate this potential concern regarding underinclusiveness. First, by 
subjecting condemnations in which private information is unneces-
sary to a more stringent test, the framework creates an incentive 
for local governments not to label parcels as “blighted” areas or 
“redevelopment” zones. These labels can stifl e economic develop-
ment and cause property values to depreciate.230 Second, the frame-
work may be appropriate in light of the political economy of takings. 
The framework is more permissive for those situations (viz., new 
assemblies) in which there is likely to be greater political resistance 
and more restrictions on the use of eminent domain and less per-
missive for those situations (viz., blighted areas and redevelopment 
districts) in which there is likely to be less political resistance and 
fewer restrictions on the use of eminent domain.231 Indeed, after Kelo, 
many states have eliminated or restricted the use of eminent domain 
for new projects in which the sole justifi cation is “economic devel-
opment.”232 The major post- Kelo issue has been to what extent local 
offi cials may rely on expansive defi nitions of blight to condemn land 
for private parties.233 This framework eliminates the possibility of 
pretext in precisely those situations in which impermissible favorit-
ism is most likely to still be a signifi cant concern.
4. Positive Externalities
Assembly projects also entail the possibility of positive externali-
ties. The potential benefi ciaries in assemblies with externalities are 
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235 See id at 44-45.
236 See notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
237 See note 96.
238 Kelo, 545 US at 476 n 4.
not only the private parties who develop the assembly site but also 
the private parties who might obtain spillovers from the project. 
The issue of externalities must therefore be examined from the per-
spective of both private developers who are considering whether to 
develop parcels and private benefi ciaries who may profi t from an 
assembly’s external effects.
If an assembly project entails a positive externality, a private de-
veloper may be unwilling to execute the project even though it would 
be socially desirable.234 To solve this problem, the government can 
provide a subsidy to the party that is ultimately selected as the 
developer.235 A subsidy is even compatible with selecting a developer 
through an auction. As long as the subsidy is set correctly and the 
parties who are bidding to become the developer know that the even-
tual developer will receive the subsidy, then each developer’s private 
incentive to bid for the project will be aligned with the optimal social 
incentive. Consequently, the possible existence of a positive exter-
nality is not an adequate justifi cation for either pre- condemnation 
private involvement or post- condemnation private involvement by 
a preferred developer.
An additional problem arises, however, in considering the poten-
tial external effects of an assembly project on other private parties. 
Because of these effects, private parties who are not directly involved 
in the project—either in providing information about the assembly 
site or in developing the site—may still have an incentive to lobby 
for a particular project or to threaten to relocate if a particular project 
does not occur. As noted above, this type of strategic behavior is pos-
sible in situations involving public developments that rely on public 
information.236 Yet, it is also possible in situations involving private 
developments such as the assembly project at issue in Kelo.
Indeed, in Kelo, it is noteworthy that there were two private enti-
ties that expected to benefi t from the redevelopment project: Cor-
coran Jennison (the potential developer of the assembly site) and 
Pfi zer Corporation (the recent purchaser of a nearby parcel).237 The 
Supreme Court noted that the New London Development Corpora-
tion was “negotiating a 99-year ground lease with Corcoran Jenni-
son” and that these negotiations were initiated “[w]hile this litiga-
tion was pending before the Superior Court.”238 Corcoran Jennison’s 
involvement thus occurred relatively late in the assembly process. 
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239 Id at 473 (describing Pfi zer’s 1998 announcement to build a “$300 million 
research facility on a site immediately adjacent to Fort Trumbull”).
240 See Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Horta-
tory Fluff”?, 33 Pepp L Rev 335, 342 (2006) (“This was a case, not of an independently 
conceived and executed municipal redevelopment effort that incidentally benefi ted 
Pfi zer when it came upon the scene, but of a jointly planned project that would 
avowedly inure to Pfi zer’s substantial benefi t.”).
241 Kelo, 545 US at 506 (Thomas dissenting).
242 Id at 478.
243 Id (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 US 229, 245 (1984)).
244 See Somin, 15 S Ct Econ Rev at 237 (cited in note 4) (“Despite longstanding 
denials by both Pfi zer executives and New London offi cials, documents obtained by 
The Day through state Freedom of Information Act requests show that the NLDC 
condemnations were undertaken in large part as a result of extensive Pfi zer lobbying 
of state and local offi cials. Pfi zer representatives apparently demanded the redevelop-
ment plan and its associated takings as a quid pro quo for its agreement to build a 
new headquarters in New London.” (citing Ted Mann, Pfi zer’s Fingerprints on Fort 
Trumbull Plan, The Day (Oct. 16, 2005))).
245 See Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just at 814 (cited in note 71) (“Suppose a rede-
velopment agency disregards its plan entirely, claims it is taking the property for one 
purpose or owner, and conveys it to another for an entirely different use?”).
By contrast, Pfi zer’s interest in the project was apparent from the 
very beginning of the process.239 While Pfi zer’s arrival in New London 
had the potential to assist in the city’s revitalization, Pfi zer was also 
in a position to obtain a signifi cant benefi t from the spillover effects 
of the assembly project.240
Ultimately, although Justice Thomas characterized the project 
as being “suspiciously agreeable to the Pfi zer Corporation,”241 the 
Court deferred to the trial court’s determination that there was “no 
evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case.”242 The Court there-
fore concluded that “the City’s development plan was not adopted 
‘to benefi t a particular class of identifi able individuals.’ ”243 However, 
additional evidence that was revealed after the Court’s decision indi-
cates the pervasiveness of Pfi zer’s pre- condemnation involvement 
with various state and local offi cials.244 This evidence suggests that 
pretext is a distinct possibility even when a private developer is not 
the private party being favored. Thus, under the burden- shifting 
framework, a condemnee could satisfy the fi rst element of the prima 
facie case by establishing the involvement of a private benefi ciary 
other than the private developer.
5. Changed Circumstances
Another situation in which pretext may arise is if local offi cials con-
demn land for a traditional public use (e.g., to build a park) and then 
announce that, rather than using the land for its original purpose, 
the parcel will be transferred to a developer for a private project.245 In 
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246 See id (“Professor Kanner recounts numerous cases where this happened, and 
courts refused to grant relief to the deceived owners—even when the agency knew at 
the time it was promulgating a plan that it would soon disregard.” (citing Kanner, 39 
Urb Law at 545-46 (cited in note 24))).
247 790 A2d 1167 (Conn 2002).
248 Id at 1170-72.
249 85 P3d 1066 (Colo 2004) (en banc).
250 Id at 1067.
251 See Lefcoe, 17 S Cal Rev L & Soc Just 815 (cited in note 71) (“[M]any states even 
before Kelo had enacted statutes and constitutional amendments granting owners of 
property previously taken an option to repurchase once the acquiring agency declares 
the land to be surplus, no longer needed by the government and potentially available 
these cases, offi cials are likely to claim that the transfer to a private 
party is justifi ed because of a change in circumstances. A number 
of courts have permitted such takings even though the condemnor 
knew beforehand that the ultimate use would differ from the original 
public purpose.246
Conversely, local offi cials may attempt to rely on a past factual 
fi nding or previous blight determination to justify a project even 
though circumstances actually have changed. For example, in Apos-
poros v. Urban Redevelopment Commission,247 the redevelopment 
commission attempted to sell land to two developers in 1997 based 
on an urban renewal plan from 1988.248 Similarly, in Arvada Urban 
Renewal Authority v. Columbine Professional Plaza Association 
(AURA),249 the urban renewal authority asserted that it retained 
the power to condemn land within an area previously designated 
as blighted “even though the entire parcel ha[d] been sold by the 
authority, developed in accordance with its urban renewal plan, and 
formally released by the authority.”250
Allowing a local government to exercise unfettered discretion in 
altering its previous plans or to rely on archaic factual fi ndings in 
justifying its current plans would increase the likelihood of a pre-
textual taking. Fortunately, the possibility of pretext in these types 
of condemnations is typically easier to detect than other types of 
pretext. Although offi cials initially may claim that a taking is for one 
purpose, the subsequent transfer of the parcel to a private developer 
for a different purpose provides an objective, and easily observable, 
indication of impermissible favoritism.
Moreover, in response to these attempts to circumvent the con-
demnation process, some states have enacted constitutional amend-
ments or statutory provisions that seek to prevent transfers to priv-
ate parties based on changed circumstances. These restrictions give 
prior owners an option to repurchase their condemned land if the 
government is no longer using the land for its original public pur-
pose.251 State courts, including the Connecticut Supreme Court in 
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for sale to the bidding public. Post- Kelo, other states are enacting such laws.” (citing 
Lynda J. Oswald, Can the Condemnee Regain Its Property if the Condemnor Aban-
dons the Public Use? 39 Urb Law 671, 680 (2007))).
252 See Aposporos, 790 A2d at 1175 (“We cannot conclude . . . that a redevelopment 
agency may make an initial fi nding of blight and rely on that fi nding indefi nitely to 
amend and extend a redevelopment plan to respond to conditions that did not exist, 
or to accomplish objectives that were not contemplated, at the time that the original 
plan was adopted.”); AURA, 85 P3d at 1067 (“[O]nce a parcel within a redevelopment 
area has been sold, developed, and released in this manner, an urban renewal authority 
may not exercise its condemnation power over any part of that parcel absent renewed 
fi ndings of blight by the appropriate authority.”).
253 Cf. Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 95-96 (cited in note 12) (surveying “all reported 
appellate cases decided between Berman v Parker and January 1, 1986, that involved a 
contested public use question” and fi nding that “[s]tate courts . . . seem more willing 
to depart from Berman’s virtual abandonment of judicial review”); Corey J. Wilk, The 
Struggle over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 
Real Prop Prob & Tr J 251, 258 (2004) (updating Merrill’s survey and fi nding a similar 
percentage of state court decisions that held that a condemnation violated the public 
use requirement).
254 See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 54 n 253 (cited in note 23) (noting that “munici-
palities and private developers also use eminent domain for the purpose of redevelop-
ing single parcels of land”).
255 See Aaron v Target Corp., 269 F Supp 2d 1162 (ED Mo 2003), rev’d on other 
grounds, 356 F3d 768 (8th Cir 2003); 99 Cents Only Stores v Lancaster Redev Agency, 
237 F Supp 2d 1123 (CD Cal 2001); Sw Ill Dev Auth v Nat’l City Envtl, LLC, 768 NE2d 
1, 10 (Ill 2002).
256 Kelo, 545 US at 487 (emphasis added).
Aposporos and the Colorado Supreme Court in AURA, also have 
been active in prohibiting transfers that are based on archaic factual 
fi ndings.252 Indeed, the holdings in Aposporos and AURA provide fur-
ther evidence that state courts are becoming increasingly aware that 
private involvement is sometimes pretextual.253
6. One- to-One Transfers
While concerns regarding pretext arise most frequently in assembly 
projects, there is also a potential for pretext in situations involving 
one- to-one transfers.254 Many of the pre- Kelo cases in which courts 
held that a taking is pretextual involved such transfers.255 In Kelo itself, 
the Court warned that “a one- to-one transfer of property, executed 
outside the confi nes of an integrated development plan, . . . would 
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot . . . .”256 
In a one- to-one transfer, the condemnor attempts to take property 
from private party A and transfer it to private party B. Favoritism is 
possible because B has an incentive to convince the government to 
invoke eminent domain on its behalf if B’s acquisition costs would be 
lower through eminent domain than voluntary exchange. This type 
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257 See Part II(A); see also Gillette, 34 Hofstra L Rev at 20 (cited in note 24) (“Just as 
spot zoning raises concerns that the person who got the exception had the fi x in, . . . 
so too are the conditions for deference relaxed where the takings decision implicates 
so few parcels that one reasonably fears a heightened risk of abuse.”).
258 See Kelly, 92 Cornell L Rev at 54 n 253 (cited in note 23) (pointing out that 
“private parties actually confront fewer bargaining problems for acquiring single prop-
erties than assembling multiple properties because the holdout problem disappears”); 
see also Law Professors Amicus Brief at *19 (cited in note 83) (arguing that “no holdout 
problem can arise in one- to-one takings”).
259 See Merrill, 72 Cornell L Rev at 75 (cited in note 12) (“Such strategic bargaining 
in a bilateral monopoly situation increases the project’s transaction costs, and if the 
transaction costs approach or exceed the project’s gains, the [project] may never be 
built.”).
260 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va L Rev 1333, 1339 
n 8 (1991) (noting that the “doctrine of easement by necessity . . . permits one property 
owner to use another’s land when this use is found ‘necessary’ to the enjoyment of the 
fi rst owner’s land, as it might when a landlocked owner has no other means of access 
to his property”).
261 See Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 Colum L Rev 55, 85 
(1987) (discussing “the bilateral- monopoly justifi cation for easements by necessity”).
of private involvement may lead to the same problems of corruption, 
secondary rent seeking, and threats to relocate as in assembly situ-
ations.257
Yet, one- to-one transfers differ from assembly projects in a fun-
damental respect: unlike assembly projects, one- to-one transfers do 
not involve the holdout problem.258 For this reason, such transfers 
usually can be accomplished through consensual, rather than forced, 
exchange. Consensual exchange is benefi cial here not only because 
it ensures that transfers are welfare- enhancing but also because it 
eliminates the possibility of pretext. Thus, private involvement in 
the takings process should be reserved only for certain types of as-
sembly projects.
One- to-one transfers could involve the problem of bilateral mo -
nop oly. In a bilateral monopoly, a situation involving a single buyer 
and a single seller, the buyer and seller both have an incentive to 
obtain as much of the surplus as possible. Strategic bargaining may 
increase transaction costs and, in some instances, such costs may 
surpass the benefi ts of the transaction.259 Consequently, a limited 
number of situations may exist in which eminent domain is neces-
sary for a one- to-one transfer. For instance, when an individual owns 
a landlocked parcel, courts will sometimes grant an easement by 
necessity.260 The justifi cation for such an easement is the potential 
bilateral monopoly problem that might exist between the landlocked 
owner and her neighbor.261
In most circumstances, however, the bilateral monopoly prob-
lem does not justify one- to-one takings on behalf of private parties. 
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262 See 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F Supp 2d at 1129 (“It is . . . undisputed that 
Costco could have easily expanded within the Power Center onto adjacent property 
without displacing 99 Cents at all but refused to do so.”).
263 768 NE2d 1 (Ill 2002).
264 Id at 10 (pointing out that “other options were available to Gateway that could 
have addressed many of the problems” and that “Gateway could have built a park-
ing garage structure on its existing property rather than develop the land owned 
by NCE”).
265 Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 Int’l Rev L 
& Econ 125, 137 (1992) (concluding that “the takings clause can be defended as a bar-
rier against a serious form of discrimination against politically disfavored groups”).
266 See Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev at 47 (cited in note 44) (discussing situations 
in which “the condemning authority condemns to prevent an undesirable use—or, at 
least, one undesired by the condemnor or its most vocal constituents—be it a landfi ll, 
low- income housing, a rehabilitation facility, or any other NIMBY- triggering use”).
267 Cf. id (“Although public use itself is a diffi cult concept for courts to wrest with, 
the non- use cases seem to pose even tougher analytical hurdles for the courts.”).
Often, a property owner will have other alternatives that prevent the 
owner’s neighbor from attempting to extract the entire surplus. For 
example, in 99 Cents Only, Costco could have expanded its store 
in a different direction without demanding that the redevelopment 
agency condemn 99 Cents Only’s leasehold interest.262 Therefore, 
there was no bilateral monopoly problem and no need for a private 
taking. Similarly, in Southwest Illinois Development Authority v. 
National City Environmental (SWIDA),263 the race track could have 
built a parking garage instead of requesting that the development 
authority take the land of its neighbor, a recycling facility, for a new 
parking lot.264 Once again, there was no bilateral monopoly problem 
and no need for a private taking. In highlighting these alternatives, 
the courts in both 99 Cents Only and SWIDA seemed to be relying 
implicitly on a type of least- restrictive- alternative requirement: if a 
private party attempts to utilize eminent domain to achieve a private 
objective, but the objective could be achieved in an alternative way, 
the taking is presumed to be pretextual.
7. “Same- Use” Takings
One- to-one transfers raise another possibility: namely, a condemna-
tion may be pretextual not only because a private party is particu-
larly favored but also because a party is particularly disfavored.265 A 
local government might decide to exercise eminent domain because 
it dislikes an owner or disapproves of the way in which the owner is 
utilizing her land.266 While discerning whether a particular party is 
disfavored may be even more diffi cult than determining whether a 
particular party is favored,267 one indication that a taking involves a 
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268 See Peter Applebome, Of the Rich, Eminent Domain . . . and Golf, NY Times, 
29 (Mar 26, 2006).
269 Id (quoting John Wilson).
270 Joseph A. Grundfest, Out of Bounds, NY Times 9 (Apr 16, 2006) (opining that 
“the Deepdale land grab makes sense only if . . . North Hills can take the golf course 
for less than 100 cents on the dollar”).
271 See Julia C. Mead, Law Shuts Door on an Open- Space Gambit, NY Times, 2 
(Aug 27, 2006).
272 RI Econ Dev Corp v The Parking Co, 892 A2d 87, 91 (RI 2006).
273 Id at 105.
274 Id.
275 Id at 107-08.
276 It is doubtful whether local offi cials in New York would have been in the best 
position to determine whether Deepdale would have a higher value as a public, rather 
than private, golf course. Even if a different fee or membership plan might enhance 
the parcel’s value, the course’s existing owners seemingly would have an incentive to 
implement such a plan. Likewise, it is doubtful whether the redevelopment corpora-
tion in Rhode Island would be in a better position than the parking garage’s current 
disfavored party is if the land’s post- condemnation use is equivalent 
to the land’s pre- condemnation use.
For example, shortly after Kelo, local offi cials in North Hills, 
New York attempted to condemn Deepdale Golf Club, a private 
golf course, and convert it into a public golf course.268 One Deepdale 
member asked: “Someone can take your golf course, and give it to 
someone else as a golf course?”269 The threatened condemnation of 
Deepdale sparked widespread opposition, with critics pointing out 
that the condemnation makes “no economic sense.”270 Eventually, 
the New York State Assembly enacted legislation that prohibits offi -
cials from condemning recreational facilities such as Deepdale.271
Similarly, the Rhode Island Development Corporation recently 
attempted to use its “quick take” authority to condemn a temporary 
easement in a multi- million dollar airport parking facility.272 The 
development corporation argued that the condemnation’s primary 
purpose was to increase the number of available parking spots.273 But, 
on appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed out that “no 
additional parking spaces were created” and that the only change in 
use appeared to be that “those parking spaces previously dedicated 
to valet parking simply were reallocated for daily parking.”274 Ulti-
mately, the Court invalidated the condemnation.275
The use of eminent domain normally requires a post- condemnation 
use that is at least ostensibly of greater value than the pre- condemnation 
use. The problem with “same- use” takings, like the threatened con-
demnation of Deepdale Golf Club or the attempted condemnation of 
the airport parking easement, is that these takings not only entail a 
risk of disfavoritism but also have no ostensible economic benefi t.276 
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operators to determine whether valet parking spaces should be reallocated for daily 
parking. Presumably, if a different allocation was more desirable, the current operators 
could reconfi gure the spaces accordingly.
277 There are several other types of takings in which pretext is an issue because the 
condemnee is a disfavored party. In these cases, like the “same use” takings, the gov-
ernment, not a private party, is often the ultimate owner of the land. However, unlike 
“same use” takings, the government might attempt to alter the land use to a different 
use that is a traditional public use. See, for example, Oswald, 35 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 
at 65-68 (cited in note 44) (discussing two cases in which the Georgia Supreme Court 
invalidated condemnations even though the asserted public purposes were traditional 
public uses (in one case, a public park; in the other, a training area for police and fi re 
offi cials)). The takings in these types of cases, however, often entail direct evidence 
of a discriminatory purpose either because the condemnor is targeting individuals 
on the basis of a suspect classifi cation such as race, see, for example, Deerfi eld Park 
Dist. v Progress Dev Corp, 174 NE2d 850 (Ill 1961) (reversing judgment of trial court 
in favor of condemnor park district where condemnee had alleged in complaint that 
park district had used power of eminent domain to prevent development of integrated 
neighborhood in violation of the Equal Protection Clause), or religion, see, for ex-
ample, Albanian Associated Fund v Twp of Wayne, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73176, 
2007 WL 2904194 (DNJ 2007) (denying town’s motion for summary judgment because 
plaintiff alleged that attempted condemnation of mosque for purpose of establishing 
“open space” was pretextual and violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000), or because the condemnor is 
clearly acting in bad faith, see, for example, Borough of Essex Falls v Kessler Institute 
for Rehabilitation, Inc, 673 A2d 856, 860-62 (NJ Super Ct Law Div 1995) (concluding 
that borough’s asserted purpose for condemning a parcel, to create additional park 
land, was a mere pretext for preventing the establishment of rehabilitation facility). 
Cf. Vill of Arlington Heights v Metro Hous Dev Corp, 429 US 252, 265-66 (1977) 
(pointing out that “judicial deference is no longer justifi ed” when there is “proof that 
a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision”).
Because of the possibility that the condemnor’s actual motive may 
be to disfavor a particular private party, such takings also should be 
considered pretextual.277
V I .  C O N C L U S I O N
In this Article, I have proposed a framework for identifying pretex-
tual takings based on the comparative competencies of local govern-
ments and private developers. When the government lacks informa-
tion regarding the optimal site for an assembly, the government may 
need to rely on a private developer to identify, as well as execute, 
an assembly project. However, when the government itself pos-
sesses information regarding the appropriate site, pre- condemnation 
private involvement, as well as post- condemnation involvement by 
a preferred private developer, is generally unnecessary.
Consequently, if a private developer is expected to obtain a distinct 
benefi t from a condemnation, the government should be required to 
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provide a legitimate justifi cation for the particular type of private 
involvement at issue. Ultimately, such an approach could be imple-
mented using a burden- shifting framework similar to the test for 
identifying pretext in Title VII cases.
Without a coherent doctrinal framework, courts may still identify 
certain takings as pretextual. For example, courts may view one-
 to-one takings or condemnations in which the post- condemnation 
use is the same as the pre- condemnation use with suspicion. But most 
other condemnations, including almost all assembly projects of any 
considerable size, would likely invoke only minimal judicial scru-
tiny. Because the projected public benefi ts of these condemnations 
are typically signifi cant, courts would continue to defer to legislative 
determinations regarding the necessity of private involvement, even 
if the reasons for such private involvement are unclear.
Yet the problem with the lack of a coherent framework is not only 
excessive judicial deference but also excessive judicial discretion. 
Unlimited discretion would permit a court to invoke the pretex-
tual takings doctrine selectively. A court might allow a particular 
assembly of which it approves even though there is a substantial 
risk of favoritism and disallow another assembly of which it disap-
proves even though there is little or no risk of favoritism. Developing 
a jurisprudence of pretext may be necessary, therefore, to prevent the 
emergence of a jurisprudence that is itself pretextual.
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